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Abstract
We investigate the importance of worldwide demographic evolutions in shaping capital
flows across countries and over time. Our lifecycle model incorporates cross-country
differences in fertility and longevity as well as differences in countries’ ability to borrow
inter-temporally and across generations through social security. In this environment,
global aging triggers uphill capital flows from emerging to advanced economies, while
country-specific demographic evolutions reallocate capital towards countries aging more
slowly. Our quantitative multi-country overlapping generations model explains a large
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1 Introduction
The world is aging and is expected to age further, as a result of a secular decline in fertility and
mortality rates worldwide. As shown in Figure 1, these trends have been especially pronounced
in emerging countries, which have seen their demographic patterns converge towards those of
advanced economies over the last decades. While the world was essentially bi-modal in the
1960s—with a marked contrast between advanced economies and emerging countries in terms
of fertility and life expectancy—demographic patterns have become more homogeneous around
the globe.1 Figure 1 nonetheless reveals substantial heterogeneity in the timing and pace of
demographic evolutions, among emerging countries in particular. While South-East Asia
experienced a fast convergence, the rest of Asia, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA),
and Latin America converged at a slower pace. Sub-Saharan Africa still displays fairly high
levels of fertility and mortality, and is projected to gradually converge in the future.
This paper investigates how these broad demographic evolutions, comprising both global
and country-specific components, can help explain patterns of capital flows across countries
and over time. A distinct feature of our theoretical and quantitative analysis is to incorporate
cross-country differences in credit markets and social security—i.e., differences in their ability
to make intertemporal and intergenerational transfers. The interactions between demographic
evolutions and these dimensions of heterogeneity occupy central stage in our work, and their
combination is essential to the quantitative success of the model.
Country-specific demographic evolutions and the global aging trend both contribute in
shaping international capital flows. On the one hand, demographic heterogeneity generates
capital flows towards countries that are younger and are aging more slowly. This force tends to
induce downhill flows towards emerging countries—most of which are importing capital in the
data. On the other hand, the common trend itself constitutes another driver of capital flows in
our setup.2 Specifically, we show that, when countries differ in their ability to borrow over the
lifecycle and across generations, global aging tends to generate uphill flows towards advanced
economies—which typically have more developed credit markets and a wider social security
coverage. This second force is quantitatively relevant to match some important features of the
1See also Figure C.1 in the appendix, as well as Lee (2003) and de Silva and Tenreyro (2017).
2Global aging, although it does affect world savings and investment, should leave capital flows unaffected
according to standard theory. For instance, in an OLG setting, if agents are expected to live longer, savings
increase on impact. However, since countries cannot all run a current account surplus, the world interest rate
adjusts, leaving capital flows unchanged. In the presence of heterogeneity in credit markets and social security,
countries’ savings respond differently to the common demographic trend, thus triggering capital flows.
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Figure 1: Fertility and Life Expectancy across the World.
Notes: Panels (a) and (c) display fertility rates adjusted for infant mortality, while panels (b) and (d) display
life expectancy at birth. See Appendix C for data sources, list of countries, and regional classification.
data. It helps to account for the vast amounts of capital flowing uphill from some emerging
countries to advanced economies in the 2000s (Bernanke (2005), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009))
and to rationalize the limited amounts of capital flowing towards emerging countries.
In the first part of the paper, we articulate our theory of aging and capital flows in a stylized
multi-country overlapping generations framework. Three generations coexist in each country:
the young borrow against future income; the middle-aged work, contribute to social security,
and save for retirement; the elderly consume out of their savings and pension benefits. The
ability to borrow and the level of social security contributions/benefits differ across countries
and are assumed to be higher in developed countries. Global and country-specific demographic
trends are captured by exogenous fertility and probability of surviving into old age.
In this setup, we characterize analytically the impact of fertility and longevity on the
interest rate and capital flows. Global aging causes a drop in the world interest rate due to
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a rise in savings and a decline in investment—even more so when the world average level of
social security is low. Uphill capital flows arise as a consequence of a divergence in savings
across countries—which is partly driven by their differential response to the interest rate drop.
In all countries, the young tend to borrow more thanks to cheaper credit. On the other hand,
the middle-aged tend to increase their savings as a result of higher longevity, but this rise
is mitigated both by a wealth effect (higher present value of future benefits) and an increase
in social security contributions (as the system adjusts to the demographic pressure). Due to
easier access to credit and higher levels of social security, the increase in borrowing by the
young and the forces that mitigate the rise in middle-aged’s savings are stronger in advanced
economies—which thus experience a deterioration in their net foreign asset positions. The
divergence in savings and the resulting uphill capital flows are reinforced when the decline in
the interest rate is more pronounced, and when the financing of social security in advanced
economies adjusts to population aging mostly through higher contribution rates, rather than
lower benefits.
We also analyze how country-specific demographic factors affect capital flows in our setup,
in the cross section and over time. Among emerging countries, differences in the timing of de-
mographic evolutions lead to markedly different outcomes in terms of capital flows. Countries
that experience an early convergence (i.e., roughly at the time they integrate to the world cap-
ital market) quickly start to export capital—possibly as soon as they open up. In contrast,
countries with a delayed convergence are more likely to experience capital inflows. Hence,
younger developing countries with more vibrant demographics may experience capital inflows,
while emerging economies that age fast export capital. More broadly, the model predicts that
rich patterns of capital flows may emerge—shaped by differences in demographics and aging
prospects, but also by the interactions between the worldwide aging trend and heterogeneity
in credit markets and social security.
In the second part of the paper, we consider a quantitative version of the model and
confront its predictions on capital flows to the data. In the quantitative setup, all features
of cross-country heterogeneity are preserved, but agents live for many periods, with some
probability of dying in each period. Considering a sample of 70 countries that covers all
regions of the globe and more than 90% of world GDP, we calibrate fertility and mortality
rates to the data for each country. Using household debt data and processing a vast amount
of information on social security systems across the world, we also calibrate the level of credit
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market development in each country, as well as the generosity of their public pension schemes.
Keeping all countries on the same productivity growth path to isolate the role of demographics,
we simulate the dynamics of the world economy assuming complete autarky until 1980, when
world capital markets integrate.
Our calibrated model broadly reproduces the salient patterns of capital flows across coun-
tries over the last decades. Upon opening in the 1980s, capital flows are relatively mod-
est despite massive demographic differences across countries, and capital tends to flow from
Western Continental Europe and Japan towards younger regions. Because they have relatively
young populations, most emerging countries initially import capital—although much less than
a model with symmetric credit constraints and social security would predict. Over time, as
some emerging countries (e.g., South-East Asia) are aging faster than the rest of the world,
they turn into creditors and replace Continental Europe and Japan as major world lenders—a
phenomenon reinforced by the fall in the world interest rate induced by global aging. Mean-
while, countries with a delayed demographic transition (Sub-Saharan Africa and, to a lesser
extent, South and Central Asia) become large debtors. Among advanced economies, global
aging accentuates the position of Anglo-Saxon countries as large debtors, while bringing Old
Europe and Japan closer to balance. Simulations suggest that such trends should perpetuate
in the future, with an even larger fraction of emerging countries turning into creditors.
To systematically assess the quantitative performance of the model, we regress capital
flows as observed in current account data over the period 1990-2015 on model-predicted flows.
The model explains a substantial fraction of the dispersion in capital flows across countries,
accounting for 30–40% of the cross-country variation in the data, with a slope coefficient that
is close to unity. Although the model misses higher frequency variations observed in the data
due to financial crises and business cycle fluctuations, it captures well, both qualitatively
and quantitatively, the long-term trends in capital flows and their cross-country dispersion.
Counterfactual experiments show that the global aging trend and cross-country differences
in demographics are both essential to the model’s performance. While the latter tend to
foster capital flows towards countries that are aging more slowly, the former—interacted with
heterogeneous credit constraints and social security—helps bring the model in line with the
data by limiting the magnitude of downhill flows towards younger developing economies,
and by generating some uphill flows towards advanced economies. As a by-product of our
quantitative analysis, we also assess the ability of global demographic changes to explain the
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sustained decline in the world interest rate and find that our model accounts for almost half
of the fall observed since 1990.
This paper contributes to an abundant literature on the economic implications of aging.
First and foremost, our analysis relates to earlier studies exploring the impact of demographic
evolutions on capital flows—including Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), Brooks (2003), Ferrero
(2010), Choukhmane (2012), and Backus, Cooley, and Henriksen (2014). In particular, our
quantitative methodology is largely inspired by the one employed in Domeij and Flode´n (2006).
Whereas prior studies mostly focus on advanced economies, the main contribution of our paper
is to incorporate emerging/developing countries in the analysis, and to show that a common
demographic trend on its own can trigger capital flows when countries are heterogeneous in
the development of their credit markets and social security systems. Second, our work relates
to a series of recent papers that assess the extent to which demographic factors can explain the
secular fall in real interest rates. Carvalho, Ferrero, and Nechio (2016), Eggertsson, Mehrotra,
and Robbins (2017), Gagnon, Johannsen, and Lo´pez-Salido (2016), and Lisack, Sajedi, and
Thwaites (2017) develop their analysis in the context of a closed advanced economy. Our paper
is more closely related to Krueger and Ludwig (2007), who investigate the impact of aging on
the future evolution of factor prices in an open-economy setting, focusing on OECD countries.
Instead, we include an extensive set of emerging economies in our quantitative exploration.
These countries, which constitute a substantial fraction of the world economy, have typically
aged later but faster than advanced economies, and also tend to have less generous social
security systems. Our findings indicate that their presence reinforces the decline in interest
rates in the most recent period. Third, our work connects to the vast literature on aging
and pension reforms, which typically adopts an OLG modelling approach similar to ours.
Whereas a majority of papers set up their analysis in a closed-economy framework, Attanasio,
Kitao, and Violante (2007), Borsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2006), and Fehr, Jokisch
and Kotlikoff (2007) study social security adjustments to aging in an open economy, focusing
on the implications for factor prices and welfare across generations and countries. Instead,
we articulate a theory of aging and capital flows and provide a quantitative evaluation of its
predictions using current account data.
From a theoretical perspective, our analysis also contributes to a large body of work
that investigates the mechanisms driving global imbalances and uphill capital flows.3 Our
3See Aguiar and Amador (2011), Bacchetta and Benhima (2015), Benhima (2013), Buera and Shin (2017),
Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008), Carroll and Jeanne (2009), Coeurdacier, Guibaud, and Jin (2015),
5
paper emphasizes the role of global aging as a potential source of capital flows from emerging
countries to advanced economies, providing a novel mechanism complementary to the ones
previously offered in the literature. Lastly, our work is related to the empirical literature
on the medium-run determinants of the current account.4 Unlike prior studies, we rely on a
quantitative model to construct a theory-grounded predictor of capital flows, which we use in
our regression-based assessment of the role of demographics as a driver of capital flows.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a tractable model of aging and capital
flows, and elucidates the main mechanisms at play. Section 3 presents the quantitative model
and its calibration to the data, and evaluates its ability to account for the patterns of capital
flows observed across the world over the last decades. Section 4 performs sensitivity analysis
and extensions. Section 5 concludes. Appendices A–D contain supplementary material.
2 Theory
The world consists of N countries populated by overlapping generations of agents who live
for at most three periods—youth (y), middle age (m), and retirement (o). Agents only work
in middle age. All countries operate the same technology (with possibly different levels of
productivity) to produce a homogeneous good that is traded freely and costlessly. Agents
share the same preferences and are immobile across countries. We describe the details of our
setup by considering a given country i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Demographics. All agents reach middle age with probability one, but a middle-aged individ-
ual in period t only survives to old age with probability pit. Individuals of the same generation
are grouped into households, each comprising a continuum of agents. We denote by Lig,t the
measure of agents belonging to generation g ∈ {y,m, o} in period t, and we denote by nit the
mass of children born to a young household in that period, implying that Liy,t+1 = n
i
tL
i
y,t. It
follows that
Lim,t+1
Lim,t
=
Liy,t
Lim,t
= nit−1 and
Lio,t+1
Lim,t+1
=
pit
nit−1
.
Eugeni (2015), Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013), Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009), Sandri (2010), Song,
Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011), and the survey by Gourinchas and Rey (2013) for further references.
4See in particular Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2014), Chinn and Prasad (2003), Higgins (1998),
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002), Taylor and Williamson (1994), and the meta-analysis by Ca’Zorzi, Chudik,
and Dieppe (2012) for further references. For evidence on the impact of demographics and its interaction with
social security on aggregate savings across countries, see Bloom et al. (2007) and Samwick (2000), as well as
Leff (1969) for a seminal contribution.
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Hence, fertility in period t− 1 determines labor force growth between periods t and t+ 1, as
well as the relative share of young to middle-aged in period t. Moreover, together with the
survival probability pit, it also affects the old-dependency ratio (L
i
o/L
i
m) in period t+ 1.
Production. There is a unique good used for consumption and investment. Gross output in
period t is given by
Y it = (K
i
t)
α
(
AitL
i
m,t
)1−α
,
where Kit denotes the capital stock at the end of period t − 1, and Ait is labor-augmenting
productivity, which grows at rate γiA,t+1 between period t and t+1. Labor and capital markets
are competitive. Assuming full capital depreciation over a generation, the wage wit in period t
and the gross rate of return Rit between period t− 1 and t are given by
wit = (1− α)Ait(kit)α and Rit = α(kit)α−1, (1)
where kit ≡ Kit/(AitLim,t) denotes the capital-effective-labor ratio.
Social Security. An agent who reaches retirement in period t receives pension benefits %itw
i
t−1,
where %it denotes the replacement rate in that period. The ‘pay-as-you-go’ social security
system is financed by taxing the labor income of middle-aged workers at rate τ it . Assuming
that the system runs a balanced budget in every period, the contribution and replacement
rates must satisfy Lim,tτ
i
tw
i
t = L
i
o,t%
i
tw
i
t−1, which is equivalent to
wit
wit−1
τ it =
pit−1
nit−2
%it. (2)
A higher old-dependency ratio (pit−1/n
i
t−2), or smaller wage growth (w
i
t/w
i
t−1), exerts pressure
on the financing of the retirement system—which needs to adjust through a combination of a
higher contribution rate (τ it ) and/or a smaller replacement rate (%
i
t).
Preferences and Budget Constraints. Let cig,t denote the consumption of an agent be-
longing to generation g in period t. A young household in period t− 1 maximizes
U it−1 = u(c
i
y,t−1) + βu(c
i
m,t) + β
2pitu(c
i
o,t+1), β ∈ ]0, 1].
Per period utility is given by u(c) = c
1−1/σ
1−1/σ , where σ ≤ 1 denotes the elasticity of intertemporal
7
substitution (e.i.s.).5 Utility maximization is subject to the flow budget constraints:
ciy,t−1 + a
i
y,t−1 = 0, (3)
cim,t + a
i
m,t =
(
1− τ it
)
wit +R
i
ta
i
y,t−1, (4)
cio,t+1 =
Rit+1a
i
m,t
pit
+ %it+1w
i
t. (5)
When young, the household needs to borrow to finance consumption. We denote by aiy,t−1 < 0
the value of their end-of-period net asset holdings. In middle age, labor income is used for debt
repayment, contribution to social security, consumption, and asset accumulation (aim,t). At the
end of middle age, the assets held by the agents who die are transferred within the household
to those who survive, so that an elderly individual receives gross income Rit+1a
i
m,t/p
i
t from
savings. In old age, agents consume all available resources, including social security benefits.
Credit Constraint. A young household in period t− 1 faces the constraint
aiy,t−1 ≥ −θit−1
wit
Rit
,
where θit−1 measures the level of credit market development in period t− 1. For tractability,
we assume that the constraint is binding in every period, which implies that6
ciy,t−1 = −aiy,t−1 = θit−1
wit
Rit
. (6)
Saving Decision in Middle Age. Combining (4)–(6) together with the first-order optimal-
ity condition with respect to cim,t yields the amount of assets accumulated by the middle-aged:
aim,t =
pit(1− τ it − θit−1)
pit + β
−σ(Rit+1)1−σ
wit −
β−σ(Rit+1)
1−σ
pit + β
−σ(Rit+1)1−σ
pit%
i
t+1w
i
t
Rit+1
. (7)
The first term in (7) captures the fact that the middle-aged’s propensity to save out of their
disposable income is increasing in their survival probability pit.
7 In the presence of social
security (%it+1 > 0), the second term corresponds to the reduction in savings induced by
5The assumption σ ≤ 1 is standard and in line with the empirical evidence. Estimates of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution are typically between 0.1 and 0.8 (see footnote 27 for references to the literature).
6This assumption, which can be formulated as a restriction on parameter values (see Remark A-1 in
Appendix A), is relaxed in the quantitative analysis.
7Our analysis assumes that τ it < 1 − θit−1, which ensures that net disposable income in middle age after
debt repayment, (1− τ it − θit−1)wit, is positive.
8
the prospect of receiving retirement benefits in old age. This term can be interpreted as
intergenerational borrowing: essentially, the middle-aged borrow against their future pension
benefits, i.e., against the contributions levied on the middle-aged workers of the next period.
2.1 Integrated Equilibrium
Under financial integration, capital flows freely across borders until rates of return are every-
where equal to the world interest rate. That is, financial integration in period t implies that
Rit+1 = Rt+1 and k
i
t+1 = kt+1, for all i. Equilibrium in the world capital market requires that
∑
i
(
Liy,ta
i
y,t + L
i
m,ta
i
m,t
)
=
∑
i
Kit+1 = kt+1
∑
i
Ait+1L
i
m,t+1.
Using (1), (2), (6), and (7), this condition can be rewritten as
kt+1
∑
i
nit−1(1 + γ
i
A,t+1)A
i
tL
i
m,t
[
1 +
1− α
α
(
θit +
β−σR1−σt+1
pit + β
−σR1−σt+1
τ it+1
)]
= (1− α)kαt
∑
i
AitL
i
m,t
pit(1− τ it − θit−1)
pit + β
−σR1−σt+1
. (8)
The left-hand side of (8) represents the world supply of assets. In any country i, the asset
supply is increasing in the ability to borrow over the lifecycle (θit) and across generations
(τ it+1), where the latter effect comes from the middle-aged implicitly borrowing against their
future pension benefits. Higher fertility (nit−1) and faster productivity growth (γ
i
A,t+1) also
have a positive impact on the asset supply by increasing the share of young borrowers in the
economy and their borrowing capacity, respectively, and by stimulating investment—through
a higher marginal productivity of capital.8 The right-hand side of the equation represents
the global ‘gross’ demand for assets by the middle-aged, which corresponds to the first term
in (7). Asset demand is decreasing in the contribution rate levied on the middle-aged savers
(τ it ), and in their past ability to borrow (θ
i
t−1). Equation (8), together with (1), governs the
dynamics of the world economy.
Steady State with Common Demographics. To analyze the determinants of the world
interest rate and capital flows, it is useful to consider a steady-state configuration in which
8Holding the contribution rate τ it+1 constant, higher values of n
i
t−1 and γ
i
A,t+1 also lead to an increase in
the replacement rate %it+1 (thanks to a lower old-dependency ratio and higher wage growth), and hence to
greater borrowing by the middle-aged against their future pension benefits.
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countries share the same demographics (nit = n, p
i
t = p) and productivity growth (γ
i
A,t = γA),
but potentially differ in terms of credit access and social security (θit = θ
i, τ it = τ
i). We denote
the weighted-average levels of credit constraints and contribution rates across countries by
θ =
∑
i
λiθi and τ =
∑
i
λiτ i, (9)
respectively, where λi = AitL
i
m,t/
∑
j A
j
tL
j
m,t is the constant share of country i in the world
effective labor force. The balanced budget constraint faced by the social security system in
each country implies that
%i =
n
p
(1 + γA)τ
i, i = 1, ..., N, (10)
i.e., higher contribution rates are associated with more generous replacement rates. This
constraint also implies that a change in demographic variables requires an adjustment of the
pension systems. To capture such adjustment in a tractable way, we assume that9
−∂τ
i/τ i
∂n/n
=
∂τ i/τ i
∂p/p
= ε, ε ≥ 0.
When ε > 0, an increase in the old-dependency ratio is—partly, fully, or more than—absorbed
by a rise in the contribution rate.10 At the same time, as long as ε < 1, social security systems
adjust to population aging at least partly through a lower replacement rate.
Lemma 1. Under the assumptions stated above, the integrated world economy converges to a
unique steady state, in which the world interest rate R satisfies
R =
n(1 + γA)
p
(
1− τ − θ)
[
p
(
α
1− α + θ
)
+ β−σR1−σ
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)]
. (11)
The steady-state interest rate is increasing in fertility and decreasing in longevity if τ < τ†,
where the threshold τ† is defined in Appendix A. The interest rate R is also increasing in the
ease of credit access θ and in the level of social security τ .
9That is, the steady-state contribution rate τ i is assumed to be an isoelastic function of the old-dependency
ratio p/n. The assumption ε ≥ 0 captures the notion that the contribution rate is adjusted upwards in response
to aging. In view of (10), the replacement rate %i has elasticities −d ln %i/d lnn = d ln %i/d ln p = −(1− ε).
10Political economy considerations suggest that a rise in the old-dependency ratio could lead to an increase
in the replacement rate (see for example Galasso et al. (2004)), which corresponds to the case ε > 1. Then,
the increase in contribution rate must also compensate for the rise in %i.
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While it is easy to see that, in the absence of social security, population aging leads to a lower
interest rate, the picture is less clear in the presence of social security.11 A drop in fertility
(n) causes the interest rate to fall by reducing investment and the share of young borrowers in
the economy. Higher longevity (p) contributes to the reduction in R by raising the propensity
to save of the middle-aged. In the presence of social security, on top of these effects, a change
in demographic variables also affects the interest rate indirectly through the adjustment of
pension systems. An increase in the contribution rate reduces the disposable income of the
middle-aged, thus dampening the increase in net savings and the associated fall in the interest
rate. On the other hand, a reduction in the replacement rate reduces the borrowing of the
middle-aged against their future retirement benefits, thus reinforcing the fall in R. Lemma 1
establishes that, as long as the average level of social security is not too high, the intuitive
result that aging causes a fall in the interest rate is maintained.12 The lemma further states
that looser credit and more developed social security both lead to higher interest rates by
increasing the supply of assets (through an increase in intertemporal and intergenerational
borrowing, respectively) and by reducing the demand for assets (through a fall in the net
disposable income of the middle-aged).
Shadow Autarky Rates and the Direction of Capital Flows. Capital flows reflect
differences in autarky rates across countries—namely, countries that export capital are those
where low interest rates would prevail under autarky. The autarky (steady-state) interest
rate of any given country satisfies (11) with the country’s own demographic and institutional
characteristics in place of the world parameters. The comparative statics derived in Lemma 1,
when interpreted cross-sectionally, thus shed light on differences in autarky rates and on the
direction of capital flows. First, holding everything else constant, countries with tighter credit
constraints (low θi) and/or less developed social security systems (low τ i) have lower autarky
interest rates and therefore tend to experience capital outflows towards the rest of the world.
Likewise, ‘older’ countries with low fertility and high longevity tend to have more depressed
autarky rates and are more likely to be capital exporters (we further discuss the impact of
country-specific aging on capital flows in Section 2.3).
11See Remark A-4 in Appendix A for a detailed analysis of how the presence of social security affects the
response of the interest rate to aging.
12The condition τ < τ† is extremely weak. For reasonable parameter values, the magnitude of the threshold
τ† is typically around or above 40%—which is well above the levels of contribution rates observed in practice
(see Figure A.1 for a numerical illustration of the magnitude of the threshold). The presence of large countries
with poorly developed pension systems tends to lower the world average contribution rate τ .
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Thinking in terms of shadow autarky rates is also useful to understand the impact of global
aging on capital flows. When countries differ in their ability to borrow over the lifecycle and/or
across generations, their autarky interest rates respond differently to a common demographic
change. We now characterize the capital flows that arise as a result of this mechanism.
2.2 Global Aging and Capital Flows
This section focuses on the impact of global aging on capital flows when countries differ in
terms of credit markets and social security—abstracting from cross-country heterogeneity in
demographics. We show that, under mild conditions, worldwide population aging tends to
generate uphill capital flows from emerging countries (low θ, low τ) to advanced economies
(high θ, high τ), especially when the associated fall in the world interest rate is large. We
first discuss the mechanism in the context of cross-country differences in access to credit, and
then turn to the case of heterogeneous social security.
Heterogeneity in Credit Constraints. Consider two countries, H and L, that only differ
in the tightness of their credit constraints, with θL < θ < θH . To simplify the discussion and
abstract from any effect driven by social security, assume that τH = τL = τ = 0.13 In the
integrated steady state, country L, which has a tighter constraint, is a creditor, while country
H is a debtor—reflecting differences in their autarky rates.14 Furthermore, the steady-state
net foreign asset positions of the two countries are such that
∆NFA ≡ NFA
L
t
Y Lt
− NFA
H
t
Y Ht
= (1− α)
(
n(1 + γA)
R
+
p
p+ β−σR1−σ
)
(θH − θL) > 0.
Global aging affects the dispersion in net foreign asset positions ∆NFA to the extent that it
exerts a different impact on net asset demand across countries. In the present configuration,
countries H and L are differently impacted by world aging for three reasons.15 First, a fall in
fertility (n) implies a smaller share of young borrowers. Since credit constraints are looser in
country H, the change in demographic composition leads to a greater increase in net savings in
that country, which tends to reduce ∆NFA. Second, a rise in longevity (p) causes an increase in
the propensity to save of the middle-aged. Since a smaller fraction of middle-age labor income
13The results derived in Proposition 1 apply to the more general case where τH = τL ≥ 0 and τ ≥ 0.
14Countries’ net foreign asset positions in the steady state are given by (A-54) in Appendix A.1.
15It is worth noting that, in the more general case τH = τL ≥ 0, the effects of aging on net savings driven
by social security are irrelevant since they affect the two countries symmetrically, and therefore do not affect
the dispersion in net foreign asset positions.
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is spent on debt repayment in country L, a higher propensity to save translates into a greater
rise in net savings in that country, leading to an increase in ∆NFA. The third channel arises
from the interaction between the equilibrium adjustment of the world interest rate to aging
and heterogeneity in credit constraints. In both countries, a fall in R leads to more borrowing
by young households and, for σ < 1, more savings by the middle-aged. The former effect
is stronger in country H where credit constraints are looser, while the latter effect is larger
in country L where a smaller fraction of middle-age labor income goes into debt repayment.
As a result, net savings increase by more (or fall by less) in country L, and the interest rate
channel contributes to an increase in ∆NFA.
This discussion suggests that (i) a global rise in longevity associated with a fall in the world
interest rate leads to greater dispersion in the NFA positions of the two countries; whereas
(ii) for a drop in fertility to have the same qualitative impact, the fall in the world interest
rate needs to be large enough—so that the interest rate channel dominates the demographic
composition effect. Proposition 1 confirms and generalizes these insights, establishing suffi-
cient conditions under which global aging generates uphill capital flows from low-θ to high-θ
countries. These conditions are expressed in terms of the elasticities
ηn ≡ ∂R/R
∂n/n
and ηp ≡ −∂R/R
∂p/p
,
which capture the equilibrium response of the world interest rate to aging.16
Proposition 1. Consider the steady state of the world economy as characterized in Lemma 1,
and suppose that there exist two countries, H and L, such that θL < θH and τH = τL. Then,
the difference in normalized net foreign asset positions between the two countries, ∆NFA =
NFALt /Y
L
t − NFAHt /Y Ht > 0, is decreasing in global fertility if ηn ≥ 1 and increasing in
world longevity if ηp ≥ 0.
In the appendix, we derive weaker conditions on the elasticities ηn and ηp for uphill flows to
arise as a result of worldwide aging—and show that they are amply satisfied for reasonable
parameter values.17 Furthermore, we prove that the larger the fall in the world interest
rate, the larger the increase in NFA dispersion. Figure 2.1 illustrates the mechanism in the
16Figures A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A.4 illustrate the magnitude of these elasticities. For realistic parameter
values, ηn and ηp are positive (as discussed in the context of Lemma 1) and decreasing in σ, capturing the
fact that the fall in R as a response to aging is larger for low values of the e.i.s. coefficient (see Remark A-6).
17See Equations (A-71) and (A-72) in the proof of Proposition 1, as well as Figure A.4 in Appendix A.4.
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Figure 2.1: Global Aging and NFA with Heterogeneous Credit Constraints.
Notes: Parameter values are α = 0.3, β = 0.96 (annual), σ = 1/2, γA = 1% (annual), θH = 15%, and
θL = 2.5%. In the initial steady state, n = 2, p = 0.4, and % = 30%. In the final steady state, n = 1.1, p = 0.8,
and % = 23.2% (that is, ε = 0.8). Changes in fertility and longevity occur between periods 0 and 2. A period
is 25 years, N = 2, and countries H and L are of equal size.
transition for realistic parameter values, depicting the dynamics of net foreign asset positions
across two countries that differ only in the tightness of their credit constraints.
Heterogeneity in Social Security. Now consider two countries, H and L, that only differ
in their public retirement systems, with τL < τ < τH , and assume that θL = θH = θ. In the
integrated steady state country L is a creditor, while country H is a debtor. The difference
in net foreign asset positions across the two countries is given by
∆NFA = (1− α)
[
p
p+ β−σR1−σ
(
τH − τL)+ β−σR1−σ
p+ β−σR1−σ
p(%H − %L)
R
]
> 0.
To make the contrast as stark as possible, suppose that country L has no social security
system at all (τL = %L = 0). In this context, world aging affects the net asset demands of
countries H and L differently through three distinct channels. First, an increase in survival
probability raises the propensity to save of the middle-aged, which has a greater impact on
net savings in country L—where middle-aged workers have more disposable income since they
do not pay social security taxes. This direct channel thus tends to increase the dispersion in
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NFA positions across the two countries.18 Second, upon a fall in R, the interest rate channel
also contributes to an increase in ∆NFA: the middle-aged in country H tend to borrow more
against their future pensions via a positive wealth effect and, for σ < 1, the higher propensity
to save exerts a greater impact on savings in country L. Third, the social security system
in country H needs to adjust to the demographic pressure. An increase in the contribution
rate (τH) lowers the net income of the middle-aged, which causes their savings to fall—thus
reinforcing the dispersion in NFA positions. On the contrary, a cut in the replacement rate
(%H) causes an increase in the savings of the middle-aged, which tends to reduce ∆
NFA.
Hence, the interplay between global aging and heterogeneity in social security can trigger
uphill capital flows—from low- to high-τ countries. This outcome is more likely when the
induced fall in the world interest rate is large and when public pension systems adjust mostly
through higher contributions. The next proposition confirms and generalizes these insights.
Proposition 2. Consider the steady state of the world economy as characterized in Lemma 1,
and suppose that there exist two countries, H and L, such that θH = θL and τL < τH . Then,
the difference in normalized net foreign asset positions between the two countries, ∆NFA =
NFALt /Y
L
t −NFAHt /Y Ht > 0, is decreasing in global fertility and increasing in world longevity
if ηn ≥ ηn and ηp ≥ ηp, respectively, where the thresholds ηn and ηp, defined in Appendix A,
are decreasing in the elasticity of the contribution rates to aging, ε.
The conditions under which uphill capital flows arise as a result of global aging are largely
satisfied for reasonable parameter values.19 The increase in NFA dispersion is stronger when
the equilibrium fall in the world interest rate is larger (i.e., high ηn, ηp) and when a greater
share of the social security adjustment goes through contributions (i.e., high ε).20 Figure 2.2
illustrates the dynamics of net foreign asset positions in the transition for two countries that
differ only in their levels of social security.
Empirical Implications. The above results imply that, in and of itself, the worldwide aging
trend illustrated in Figure 1 can act as a driver of capital flows. Specifically, to the extent
that emerging economies are characterized by tighter access to credit and less developed social
security systems, our theory predicts that global aging tends to trigger uphill capital flows.
18This is reinforced by the fact that an increase in p lowers the rate R/p at which middle-aged households
discount future benefits—which reduces middle-age savings in country H through a positive ‘wealth effect’.
19Appendix A establishes sufficient conditions in terms of parameter values. See also Figure A.5.
20A higher elasticity of the contribution rate to aging dampens the fall in R (i.e., ηn and ηp are lower), which
reduces the strength of the interest rate channel. However, through its impact on the sign and magnitude of
the social security channel, a higher value of ε reinforces uphill capital flows.
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Figure 2.2: Global Aging and NFA with Heterogeneous Social Security.
Notes: Parameter values are α = 0.3, β = 0.96 (annual), σ = 1/2, γA = 1% (annual), θ = 8%. In the initial
steady state, n = 2, p = 0.4, with replacement rates %H = 50% and %L = 10%. In the final steady state,
n = 1.1, p = 0.8, with replacement rates %H = 38.6% and %L = 7.7% (i.e., ε = 0.8). Changes in fertility and
longevity occur between periods 0 and 2. A period is 25 years, N = 2, countries H and L are of equal size.
More broadly, if one were to rank countries in terms of credit access (θi) and generosity of
public pensions (τ i), Propositions 1 and 2 characterize how the response of capital flows to
a common aging trend differs across countries according to their relative positions. In the
quantitative part of our analysis, we carefuly measure these two dimensions of cross-country
heterogeneity and evaluate the relevance of these mechanisms to understand the dispersion of
capital flows.
2.3 Country-Specific Aging and Capital Flows
We now discuss the effects of country-specific demographic evolutions on capital flows. To ab-
stract from the general equilibrium effect of aging on the interest rate, we consider a small open
economy (SOE)—say, country i (with weight λi ≈ 0). The following proposition characterizes
the impact of country i’s own demographics on its NFA position.21
Proposition 3. Country i’s NFA position in period t is determined by lagged fertility, nit−1,
and the longevity of the middle-aged, pit. Furthermore,
21The expression for country i’s NFA position is given by Equation (A-78) in Appendix A.3.
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i. If %it+1 = 0, country i’s NFA position is decreasing in fertility and increasing in longevity.
ii. If %it+1 > 0, country i’s NFA position is decreasing in fertility and increasing in longevity
if εit+1 ≤ ε˜n and εit+1 ≤ ε˜p, respectively,
where εit+1 denotes the elasticity of the contribution rate τ
i
t+1 to the old-dependency ratio
Lio,t+1/L
i
m,t+1, and the thresholds ε˜n and ε˜p are defined in Appendix A.
The impact of demographic variables on the NFA position of a small open economy is anal-
ogous to their effect on the country’s (shadow) autarky interest rate. A drop in fertility
and/or a rise in longevity directly leads to an improvement in the country’s NFA position—as
captured by statement (i) in Proposition 3. However, such demographic changes also operate
indirectly via the adjustment of the pension system.22 The sign and magnitude of this indirect
effect depends on the form of the adjustment, captured by the elasticity εit+1. A decrease in
the replacement rate reinforces the direct effect of aging on the country’s NFA position, while
an increase of the contribution rate works in the opposite direction. For reasonable parameter
values, the thresholds ε˜n and ε˜p are both largely above unity. Thus, for any realistic adjust-
ment of the contribution rate to aging, lower fertility and higher longevity both translate into
an increase in net foreign asset holdings.
Empirical Implications. According to Proposition 3, countries with more vibrant demo-
graphics tend to be debtors, while older ones tend to be creditors. Over time, holding every-
thing else constant (including global demographics), a fall in fertility or a rise in longevity in a
given country tends to be associated with capital outflows—although to a lesser extent when
a larger share of the social security adjustment goes through an increase in contributions.
Numerical Illustration. Figure 2.3 illustrates the response of capital flows to country-
specific aging for an emerging SOE—characterized by credit constraints that are tighter than
in the rest of the world, and by a less developed social security system. The emerging SOE
starts from an initial autarky steady state and integrates to the world economy at date t = 0.
While both the SOE and the rest of the world are aging, the emerging country is initially
characterized by higher fertility and lower longevity. Over time, the demographic patterns of
the SOE converge to those of the rest of the world. Panel (a) of Figure 2.3 corresponds to a
22Recall that Lio,t+1/L
i
m,t+1 = p
i
t/n
i
t−1. Hence, a change in n
i
t−1 and/or p
i
t must cause an adjustment of the
contribution rate τ it+1 and/or the replacement rate %
i
t+1 for the balanced budget condition to remain satisfied.
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Figure 2.3: Impact of Country-Specific Aging in a Small Open Emerging Economy.
Notes: In panels (a) and (b), the first two subplots depict the exogenous evolution of fertility and longevity
in the SOE and the rest of the world (RoW). The SOE (dashed line) integrates to the RoW (solid line) at
t = 0. The RoW is characterized by θ = 15%, initial replacement rate %−2 = 35%, and final replacement rate
%6 = 31.7%. The SOE is characterized by θ = 2.5%, %−2 = 5%, and %6 = 3.6%. Other parameter values are
α = 0.3, β = 0.96 (annual), σ = 1/2, and γA = 1% (annual). A period is 25 years.
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case of fast demographic convergence, while panel (b) corresponds to a case where convergence
takes place more slowly.
Independently of the pace of convergence, saving and investment rates in the emerging
economy both increase upon integration (bottom-right corner of each panel). However, the
speed of convergence affects the timing and magnitude of their respective increases. In the
case of a fast demographic convergence, savings increase faster than investment, leading the
SOE to export capital (panel (a)). Instead, with a more prolonged convergence, the rise in
savings is delayed—as the composition effect induced by a fall in fertility (i.e., relatively less
young borrowers) and the increase in middle age savings caused by a rise in longevity both
set in more slowly—while the increase in investment at opening is stronger, as fertility is
expected to remain high for some time before converging. As a result, in the latter scenario,
the small emerging country initially borrows from the rest of the world (panel (b)). Theory
thus predicts that, depending on the speed of demographic convergence, capital may either
flow uphill towards the rest of the world, or downhill towards emerging economies.
3 Quantitative Analysis
This section evaluates the ability of our theory to account for the patterns of capital flows
observed across the world over the last decades. Our quantitative model enriches the analytical
framework of Section 2 along several dimensions. We first describe the augmented setup and
its calibration. The assessment of the model’s quantitative performance follows.
3.1 A Multi-Period OLG Model
Countries are populated with agents whose economic life runs for at most J¯ + 1 periods. We
denote by pij,t the probability that an agent of age j = 0, . . . , J¯ in period t and country i
survives to the next period (by construction, pi
J¯,t
= 0 for all i and t). Taking mortality into
account, the number of agents reaching age 1 ≤ j ≤ J¯ in period t is given by
Lij,t =
(
j−1∏
`=0
pi`,t−j+`
)
Li0,t−j,
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where the size of the youngest active age group evolves exogenously according to23
Li0,t+1 = (1 + γ
i
L,t+1)L
i
0,t.
Production. Agents potentially work all their life. Gross output in country i is given by
Y it = (K
i
t)
α
[
Ait
J¯∑
j=0
eij,tL
i
j,t
]1−α
= AitLˆ
i
t(k
i
t)
α,
where Lˆit ≡
∑J¯
j=0 e
i
j,tL
i
j,t denotes the total efficiency-weighted population, and k
i
t = K
i
t/(A
i
tLˆ
i
t)
denotes the capital-effective-labor ratio. The set of efficiency weights {eij,t}J¯j=0 captures the
shape of the age-income profile in period t and country i. The labor income received by an
agent of age j in period t and country i is wij,t = e
i
j,tw
i
t, where w
i
t ≡ (1 − α)Ait(kit)α. Finally,
the gross rate of return between t − 1 and t is Rit = 1 − δ + α(kit)α−1, where δ denotes the
depreciation rate of capital over one period.
Social Security. An agent of age j > J in period t and country i receives social security
benefits piij,t equal to a fraction %
i
t of labor income earned at age J , that is, pi
i
j,t = %
i
tw
i
J,t−j+J .
Social security contributions are levied on labor income at a flat rate τ it . For the social security
system to be balanced in every period, the paths of contribution and replacement rates must
be such that
τ it
J¯∑
j=0
Lij,tw
i
j,t = %
i
t
J¯∑
j=J+1
Lij,tw
i
J,t−j+J . (12)
Unintentional Bequests. Let aij,t denote the end-of-period net asset holdings of an agent
of age j in period t. The aggregate wealth of agents who die at the end of period t, given by
Qit ≡
J¯−1∑
j=0
(1− pij,t)Lij,taij,t, (13)
is equally redistributed as lump-sum transfers to a subset of agents—namely, agents of age
j ∈ B who survive to the next period.24 Denoting by qij,t the wealth transfer received by a
23Any sequence {γiL,t} can equivalently be expressed as an explicit sequence of (past) fertility rates, at the
cost of more cumbersome notation. In the steady state, γiL,t = γ
i
L coincides with the overall population growth
rate in country i.
24When an indebted agent dies, the (riskfree) loan is effectively repaid by bequest recipients.
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surviving agent of age j at the end of period t, we thus have qij,t = 0 for j /∈ B and
qij,t =
Qit∑
m∈B p
i
m,tL
i
m,t
for j ∈ B. (14)
Individual Optimization. Let cij,t denote the consumption of an agent of age j in period t
and country i. An agent who enters active life in period t maximizes
U it = u(c
i
0,t) +
J¯∑
j=1
(
j−1∏
`=0
pi`,t+`
)
βju(cij,t+j), (15)
with isoelastic preferences u(c) = (c1−
1
σ − 1)/(1− 1
σ
), subject to the flow budget constraints
cij,t+j + a
i
j,t+j = R
i
t+j(a
i
j−1,t+j−1 + q
i
j−1,t+j−1) + (1− τ it )wij,t + piij,t 0 ≤ j ≤ J¯, (16)
with the notational convention ai−1,t−1 = q
i
−1,t−1 = 0 and pi
i
j,t = 0 for all j ≤ J . The agent also
faces a sequence of credit constraints of the form
aij,t+j ≥ −θit+j
pij,t+jH
i
j+1,t+j+1
Rit+j+1
for j ≤ J¯ − 1 and aiJ¯,t+J¯ ≥ 0, (17)
where H ij,t denotes the expected discounted present value of current and future labor income
for an individual who reaches age j in period t, namely,
H ij,t = w
i
j,t +
J¯−j∑
τ=1
(∏τ−1
s=0 p
i
j+s,t+s
)
wij+τ,t+τ∏τ
s=1 R
i
t+s
for j ≤ J¯ − 1 and H iJ¯,t = wiJ¯,t.
Equilibrium. For a given evolution of demographics, productivity, credit tightness, and
replacement rates, the model equilibrium consists of sequences for the capital-effective-labor
ratios {kit}, consumption
{
cij,t
}
, asset holdings
{
aij,t
}
, wealth transfers
{
qij,t
}
, and contribution
rates {τ it} such that: (i) all agents maximize their lifetime expected utility (15) subject to the
sequence of budget constraints (16) and credit constraints (17); (ii) the consistency condition
(14) between wealth transfers and unintentional bequests holds; (iii) the social security budget
constraint (12) is satisfied; and (iv) the market for capital clears in every period, either locally
(under financial autarky) or globally (under integration).
21
3.2 Calibration
This section presents our baseline quantitative experiment and provides a detailed description
of the calibration of common and country-specific model parameters.
Experiment. We simulate the model over a large sample of countries, each having its own
demographic, credit market, and social security characteristics. To isolate the role of de-
mographics, countries share a common growth rate of productivity. Demographics are held
constant until 1950, when the demographic transitions begin. Countries start from their au-
tarky steady states and remain in autarky until they integrate financially in 1980. All changes
are anticipated. In the long run, fertility rates converge to the same level across countries
and the global economy converges to a final integrated steady state. Appendix B provides a
detailed description of the numerical solution method (see Section B.5, in particular).
Country Sample. To obtain the sample of countries included in the experiment, we start
by considering the 100 most populated economies in 1990. Focusing on population size rather
than GDP enables us to obtain a well-balanced sample of advanced and developing countries.
We then remove two types of countries whose capital flows are largely driven by factors outside
of our model. Namely, we exclude major energy-exporting countries,25 as well as countries
plagued by very deadly conflicts—which usually experience massive capital flights or large
capital inflows to sustain war efforts.26 Finally, we eliminate countries for which some of the
inputs needed for our simulations are missing. This leaves us with a sample of 70 countries,
covering all areas of the globe and accounting for 91% of world GDP (85% of world population)
in 2000. The list of countries in our final sample is provided in Appendix C.2.
Common Parameters. We now turn to the calibration of model parameters that are com-
mon across countries, summarized in Table 1. A period lasts for 5 years, which corresponds
to the frequency at which demographic data are available. Adult life runs for at most 16
periods—which map into age brackets 20-24, 25-29, . . . , 95-99—and agents receive social se-
curity benefits after age 64.
Preferences and Technology. Preference and technology parameters are set to standard values,
in line with the literature. We set the discount factor β to 0.96 annually. The elasticity of
25Using COMTRADE data, we drop countries for which net exports of oil and gas are above 15% of GDP
on average post-1990. Russia and Bolivia, despite being fairly large energy exporters, remain in our sample.
26Using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, we drop countries that have suffered severe conflicts
on their soil, with a casualty rate that exceeds 1/1000 of the population at the start of the conflict.
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Table 1: Parameters Common Across Countries.
Preference and Technology
β discount factor, per year 0.96
σ e.i.s. coefficient 0.5
α capital share 0.3
δ depreciation rate, per year 0.08
γA productivity growth, per year 0.01
Age-Income Profile
Age 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80+
ej 0.42 0.71 0.88 0.98 1.03 1.04 1 0.85 0.53 0.22 0.10 0.05 0
intertemporal substitution σ is set to 0.5, in the mid-range of empirical estimates.27 However,
since the value of the e.i.s. coefficient potentially matters quantitatively, we perform sensitivity
analysis around this baseline value. The capital share α is set to 0.3 and the depreciation rate
δ to 8% per year. Productivity grows at a constant rate γA = 1%.
Age-Income Profile. Efficiency parameters are assumed to be constant over time and common
across countries (eij,t = ej), and are set to match the age-income profile in the U.S. (relative
to the 50-54 age bracket), based on labor income data by age groups from the American
Community Survey for the year 2005. The age-income profile in the U.S. is very stable over
the period 1990-2010, hence our results are not sensitive to the choice of year 2005.
Bequest Transfers. We assume that unintentional bequests are evenly redistributed across
individuals of age 25-59, reflecting bequests towards children and grandchildren. Results are
barely sensitive to alternative redistribution schemes.
Country-Specific Parameters. Next, we describe our approach to calibrating the param-
eters that capture the key dimensions of heterogeneity emphasized by our theory. Measuring
these over a large sample of countries, comprising both developed and emerging economies,
constitutes an important aspect of our quantitative exercise.28
Demographics and Country Size. Calibrated values for demographic parameters are based on
data from the United Nations (World Population Prospects), available at a 5-year frequency.
27The vast majority of the empirical literature finds estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
between 0.1 and 0.8. Among other references, see Hall (1988), Attanasio and Weber (1993), Ogaki and
Reinhart (1998), Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), Yogo (2004), and Best et al. (2017), as well as the surveys by
Campbell (2003) and Attanasio and Weber (2010). Lifecycle saving models typically use values between 0.3
and 0.5 (e.g. Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006) and De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010)), while the
macro asset pricing literature (discussed in Guvenen (2006)) often assumes higher values closer to unity.
28Appendix C provides further details on the data used in the calibration and on calibrated parameter values
for all countries in the sample. Our dataset is available upon request.
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With worldwide coverage, the data provides population composition and survival probabilities
(from the life tables) by age groups over the period 1950-2015, and also includes demographic
forecasts until 2100. In the initial steady state of a given country i, the survival probabilities
pij are set to their 1950 values, while the population growth rate γ
i
L is chosen to best match
the observed age composition in 1950. For years 1955, 1960, . . . , 2015, the growth rate of
the youngest age group γiL,t as well as the survival probabilities p
i
j,t are set to their data
counterparts.29 For the period 2015-2100, we proceed similarly, matching the U.N. forecasts.
Post-2100, survival probabilities are held constant at their 2100 values and population growth
is set to zero in all countries. Initial population and productivity levels are set to match
relative population size and GDP across countries in 2000.
Credit Constraints. To calibrate country-specific credit constraint parameters, we rely on
household debt data collected from various sources. Such data, however, is missing for some
countries in our sample. To remediate this issue, we predict household debt-to-GDP ratios
for these countries based on variables that are observable and correlated with household debt,
namely, the fraction of the population aged 15 and above with a mortgage, the fraction having
ever borrowed from a financial institution, and private credit over GDP.30 As a baseline, credit
constraint parameters are assumed to be time-invariant (θit = θ
i). For a given country i, the
ratio θi/θUS is chosen to match household debt to GDP in country i (observed or predicted)
relative to the U.S. in 2005.31 The resulting heterogeneity in credit market development
is substantial—with constraints about 5 to 10 times tighter in emerging countries than in
advanced economies. The remaining free parameter, θUS, is set to match aggregate savings
over GDP in the U.S. in 2005 (17.7%), leading to a value of 16%.32 An alternative experiment
considered in Section 4 allows for time-varying constraints, to better account for credit market
evolutions over the last decades (deepening until 2008, followed by tightening).
Social Security. To calibrate social security systems for all the countries in our sample, we
proceed in two steps (see Appendix C.5 for details). First, we collect information on pay-
29As displayed in Appendix C.3, the model matches the observed age composition fairly well (although not
perfectly, partly due to migration flows). Accordingly, when survival probabilities are instead calibrated to
match the age composition data, our quantitative results are barely affected.
30See Appendix C.4 for a detailed description. The predictive regression is estimated over the period 1990-
2015 on the set of 54 countries for which household debt data are available. The R2 of the regression is 0.83
and the predicting variables are highly significant. Using alternative predictors yields very similar results.
31Household debt data are available for a large set of countries post-2000. We choose 2005 for consistency
with the calibration of social security, but cross-sectional differences are very persistent over the period.
32Figure C.4 in the appendix displays the calibrated values of credit constraint parameters for all the
countries in our sample in relation to their household debt-to-GDP ratios.
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as-you-go systems across countries from the Social Security Administration website. For
each country, we construct a schedule of replacement rates for an average income earner, as a
function of the number of years of contribution. Taking the difference between country-specific
ages of retirement and labor market entry to proxy for the number of years of contribution,
we thus obtain an official replacement rate, denoted by %˜i.33
However, one also needs to account for the actual coverage of social security programs,
which varies a lot across countries. In developing countries, for instance, typically few workers
contribute to the official system and qualify for any benefits. In our framework, lower coverage
translates into lower contribution and replacement rates. As a second step, we thus adjust
for coverage, using data from the World Social Security Report (ILO).34 The data provides
two different measures of coverage: the percentage of retired receiving benefits, χiB, and the
percentage of the working age population contributing to pensions, χiC .
35 The former measure
is typically above the latter, reflecting the existence of universal minimum benefits. In our
baseline calibration, we set the effective replacement rate in country i to
%i =
(
χiB + χ
i
C
2
)
%˜i,
taking the average of χiB and χ
i
C to alleviate concerns about measurement error or potential
biases in each of the two measures. Section 4 performs sensitivity analysis, considering the
alternative calibrations %iB = χ
i
B%˜
i and %iC = χ
i
C %˜
i.36
3.3 Model vs. Data
In the spirit of Domeij and Floden (2006), we simulate capital flows in the calibrated model and
confront the model predictions to their data counterpart. Because many emerging countries
had capital account restrictions until the late-1980s/early-1990s (see Bekaert et al. (2005)
and Chinn and Ito (2008)), we focus on capital flows from 1990-2015. Net capital flows are
33Other studies have computed (official) replacement rates for a restricted number of countries. When such
data exists, we check that our measure is in line with alternative sources (see Appendix C.5).
34ILO data are based on surveys conducted for the vast majority in 2005/2006, which is why we focus on
2005 in the calibration. The data is available for most countries in our sample. When it is missing, we predict
the coverage rate based on correlated variables using a logistic regression (see Appendix C.5).
35Figure C.5 in the appendix confirms that large disparities exist around the world according to both
measures. In low income countries, about 20-30% of the population is covered by social security on average,
compared to 70-80% in more advanced economies.
36In our view, %iB (resp. %
i
C) provides an upper bound (resp. a lower bound) for the effective replacement
rate. Our baseline calibration uses the average between these two bounds.
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measured as current account over GDP, averaged over five-year periods, for each of the 70
countries in our sample. Due to some missing current account observations, the data consists
of an unbalanced panel of 402 country×period observations.
Methodology. Let cadi,t (resp. ca
m
i,t) denote the current account-to-GDP ratio of country i in
period t as observed in the data (resp. as predicted by the model). To assess the quantitative
performance of our model, we consider the regression equation
cˆadi,t = γ cˆa
m
i,t + i,t, (18)
where cˆadi,t = ca
d
i,t− cadt (resp. cˆami,t = cami,t− camt ), and i,t is a residual capturing the variation
in the data that is orthogonal to the model. Both the data and the model predictions are
demeaned in the cross section (period by period) to deal with the fact that current account
data are not balanced.37 Equation (18) is estimated as a pooled regression, in the ‘between’
and ‘within’ dimensions, and in the cross section in each period. Moreover, we also consider
the time-differenced version of (18), looking at the cross section of changes in current account-
to-GDP ratios over a 20-year period (1995-2015).38
Performance Metrics. To evaluate the model’s ability to account for observed capital flows
and compare performance across alternative calibrations, we report a couple of basic statistics.
A ‘good’ model should be such that the R2 of regression (18) is high and the estimate of γ is
close to unity. The R2 on its own can be misleading: a model that yields a negative regression
coefficient is not a good one, even if it has a high R2. As a (reliable) summary measure of
distance between model and data, we compute the normalized mean squared error
D =
var(cˆad − cˆam)
var(cˆad)
. (19)
The distance metric D reflects the variation in the data that the model cannot account for.
Conditionally on the coefficient γ being unity, the regression R2 is exactly equal to 1−D.
37In any period, capital markets clear globally in the model but not in the data. Equivalently, one could
consider the regression: cadi,t = γ ca
m
i,t + φt + i,t, where φt is a period fixed effect.
38We focus on the period 1995-2015 for the time difference since 1990 current account data are missing for
a few countries, and countries were also arguably less financially integrated in 1990 than in the later periods.
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Regression coefficient
Distance
R-squared
Figure 3.1: Model versus Data: Performance Summary.
Notes: For each specification, the top panel shows the estimate of the slope coefficient in regression (18) along
with its 5% confidence interval, the middle panel displays the distance between model and data as defined by
(19), and the bottom panel shows the regression R2. Regressions are performed with pooled data (standard
errors clustered at the country level), in the cross section by years, in the between and within dimensions, and
in the cross section of changes over the period 1995-2015. Model-predicted current account-to-GDP ratios are
obtained under the baseline calibration described in Section 3.2.
3.4 Results
Figure 3.1 plots the estimate of γ with its 5% confidence interval, the distance D between
model and data, and the R2 of regression (18) for all specifications: pooled, cross sections by
year, between, within, and 1995-2015 change. In the pooled regression and in all years except
1990, the coefficient estimate is close to unity, and the R2 is between 20% and 35%.39 In
the between dimension, the model’s fit to the data is even better, with an R2 close to 40%.
Performance deteriorates substantially in the within dimension (γ significantly below 1 and
39Results for the year 1990 should be taken with caution. As discussed in Section 4.1, performance in that
year improves a lot when one excludes observations for countries that had very low capital account openness.
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Figure 3.2: Model versus Data: Between Variation.
Notes: For each country in the scatter plot, the x-coordinate (resp. y-coordinate) corresponds to the average
current account over GDP predicted by the model (resp. observed in the data) over 1990-2015. Model and
data are demeaned in each period. The solid (grey) line is the 45 degree line and the dashed (red) line is the
regression line. Model predictions are obtained under the baseline calibration described in Section 3.2.
low R2), but the model fares better when looking at current account changes over 1995-2015
(γ not significantly different from 1). Inspection of the distance measure across different
specifications corroborates these conclusions. As expected, when the estimate of γ is around
unity, the regression R2 is very close to 1 −D. Henceforth, when summarizing performance
for alternative model calibrations, we only report the estimated slope and the distance metric.
In short, the model does a good job at matching current account data in the cross section,
but less so over time. The model’s ability to capture long-term trends in capital flows and
their dispersion across countries is illustrated in Figure 3.2, which displays the model’s fit to
the data in the between dimension.
Capital Flows over Time by Regions/Countries. To assess the time variation that our
model is able to capture—as well as where it fails—it is useful to compare current account
series as predicted by the model (cami,t) to those observed in the data (ca
d
i,t). Figure 3.3 depicts
model-implied capital flows over the period 1990-2025 (solid lines) along with their empirical
counterpart over 1990-2015 (dashed lines) for all regions and selected countries. In all panels,
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Figure 3.3: Capital Flows over Time by Regions/Countries.
Notes: This figure depicts the time series of current account over GDP predicted by the model (solid lines)
along with their data counterpart (dashed lines) for all regions and selected countries. Predictions are obtained
under the baseline calibration described in Section 3.2. See Appendix C.2 for the composition of each region.
the magnitude of model-predicted flows is, on average over the period, in line with the data.
The top-left panel of Figure 3.3 illustrates the evolution of external imbalances between
the U.S., Western Continental Europe/Japan, and China. Focusing first on the U.S. and
China, the model predicts the widening of global imbalances—the consequence of both faster
aging in China and global aging, which reinforces capital flows from low- to high-θ countries.
It also predicts that an emerging market like China replaces Old Europe/Japan as major
world creditor. These trends are expected to continue in the future. In particular, due to the
increasing share of elderly together with generous pension systems, Europe and Japan should
eventually turn into borrowers.
The top-right panel in the figure zooms in on the evolution of current account positions
within Old Europe/Japan. Having aged faster than Continental Europe, Japan is initially the
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main creditor. Over time, due to aging in Europe and the rising share of elderly in Japan,
differences in current account balances diminish. Within Continental Europe, Portugal, an
initially younger country with relatively easy access to credit and a generous social security
system, is a net external borrower—while France, an older country with comparatively tighter
credit and less generous pensions, is a net lender.40 In the model, as Portugal is becoming
more similar to France in terms of demographics, the external imbalances narrow down. While
these evolutions are qualitatively in line with the data, the model misses the magnitude of
external borrowing in Portugal pre-2010—just like it misses the extent of borrowing in the
U.S. prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis and the subsequent rebalancing.
The bottom panels of Figure 3.3 depict capital flows for different parts of the develop-
ing/emerging world. In the model as in the data, capital flows downhill towards younger
regions: Sub-Saharan Africa and, to a lesser extent, Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
and South and Central Asia. This pattern becomes more pronounced over time, as other
emerging markets that are aging faster become creditors—South-East Asia, followed by Latin
America. Overall, these two panels illustrate the role of demographics as a key driver of
differences in capital flows across emerging countries.41 Nonetheless, while our model cap-
tures the broad trends well, it does miss the fast current account reversal in South-East Asia
around the 1997 financial crisis—and similarly for Latin America around the mid 2000s. That
low-frequency demographic evolutions have a hard time accounting for high-frequency varia-
tions in the data is not very surprising. At higher frequency, business cycle fluctuations and
financial shocks are better candidates to explain capital flows.
The World Interest Rate. According to the theory, capital flows in our framework are
partly driven by the fall in the world interest rate induced by population aging. Figure 3.4
illustrates the decline in the interest rate predicted by the quantitative model over the period
1990-2030, under the baseline and alternative calibrations. In the baseline, the interest rate
falls by about 1.7 percentage points between 1990 and 2015, accounting for almost half of the
fall in the 5-year real interest rate observed in the U.S. over this period.
The analysis of Section 2 sheds light on the forces that drive the drop in the interest rate
40The calibrated credit constraint parameters (θi) for Portugal and France are 12.4% and 8.1%, respectively,
and their effective replacement rates (%i) are 68.8% and 40.3%.
41Because fast-aging emerging countries also tend to be the ones that are growing faster (e.g., South-East
Asia versus slow-growing but younger Sub-Saharan Africa), demographic factors may help explain why the
(negative) correlation between current account and growth predicted by the standard neoclassical model fails
to hold across emerging countries—which Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) refer to as an ‘allocation puzzle’.
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Figure 3.4: Decline in the World Interest Rate: Model versus Data.
Notes: The figure depicts the evolution of the real interest rate in the model and in the data (in percentage
points, relative to 1990). Model predictions are obtained under the baseline calibration (as per Section 3.2),
for higher and lower values of the e.i.s. coefficient (σ = 1 and σ = 1/4), and by running the baseline experiment
on a subsample of high-income OECD countries (holding all parameters at their baseline values). The data
represents a proxy for the U.S. 5-year real interest rate, constructed using the 5-year nominal Treasury rate
and CPI inflation (see Appendix C.1 for data sources and details).
implied by the model (see Lemma 1). Beyond the direct impact of the worldwide decline in
fertility and mortality on global savings and investment, the drop in the interest rate also
results from the fact that, over time, the world (weighted-average) level of credit access and
social security falls. Indeed, despite their own aging, emerging countries experience higher
demographic growth than the rest of the world—leading to an increase in their relative size
and a fall in θ and τ , in terms of the notations introduced in (9). By making net asset demand
less sensitive to a change in the interest rate, a lower e.i.s. coefficient σ implies a larger interest
rate drop, as illustrated in the figure (see also Lemma A-2 in the appendix).
To assess how the presence of less developed countries affects the evolution of the world
interest rate, we perform the same experiment on high-income OECD countries.42 Although
the quantitative effects are mild, comparing interest rate paths across experiments reveals that,
until 2005, the decline in interest rate is slightly stronger in the rich-country experiment, while
42This experiment is related to the work of Carvalho et al. (2016), Eggertsson et al. (2017), Gagnon et al.
(2016), and Lisack et al. (2017) who, in exploring the extent to which demographic factors can account for the
prolonged decline in real interest rates, focus on the U.S. and other advanced countries in a closed-economy
context.
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the presence of emerging countries accelerates the fall after 2005. This pattern is consistent
with cross-country differences in the timing of the fertility drop (Figure 1). While most of the
drop occurs between the mid-1950s and the late-1970s in advanced economies, the convergence
of emerging countries starts in the late-1960s—with a 15-year lag—and continues today. In
the rich-country experiment, the interest rate is not predicted to decrease much further post-
2025, as the rising share of elderly with a low propensity to save mitigates the other effects
of aging. When including emerging countries, the fall in interest rate is 30 basis points larger
by 2030 and is expected to be more prolonged.43
3.5 Inspecting the Mechanisms
In our framework, capital flows are driven by demographic evolutions—both common and
country-specific—and their interactions with cross-country heterogeneity in credit constraints
and social security. To disentangle the various forces at play, we run a series of alternative
experiments and compare their implications for capital flows to the baseline and the data. For
the sake of brevity, we focus on results in the between dimension, although findings are very
similar in other specifications. Figures 3.5 and 3.7 summarize our results.
The Role of Aging. First, we run several counterfactuals to assess the role of different
aspects of worldwide demographic evolutions in shaping capital flows. All parameters other
than demographics are set to their baseline values. To start with, we consider an experiment
where countries do not age at all, keeping demographic parameters in each country at their
initial values, calibrated to 1950 data. This counterfactual isolates the pure effect of integration
between initially heterogeneous countries and reveals that demographic changes are essential
to understand capital flows. The regression coefficient is not significantly different from zero
and the distance between model and data is very large (Figure 3.5, ‘no aging’). Without aging,
the model explains almost none of the cross-sectional variation in capital flows and generates
much less dispersion than in the data (see also panel (a) in Figure 3.6).
Longevity vs. Fertility. We then consider two counterfactuals that isolate the respective roles
played by the rise in longevity and the decline in fertility. First, keeping fertility fixed at
its initial 1950 value in each country, we let survival probabilities increase as in the data
43This finding echoes the results of Krueger and Ludwig (2007), who investigate the impact of faster aging in
the rest of OECD relative to the U.S. on future interest rates. In our study, the impact of including emerging
countries on the current and future fall in the interest rate is an order of magnitude larger. By 2080, the world
interest rate falls by one percentage point more in the baseline compared to the rich-country experiment.
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Figure 3.5: The Role of Aging: Performance Summary.
Notes: For each calibration, the top panel shows the estimate of the regression coefficient in (18) with its 5%
confidence interval, while the bottom panel displays the distance between model and data as defined by (19).
Model and data are averaged in the between dimension. In columns 1–3, model predictions are obtained by
holding demographic characteristics fixed to their 1950 values, by holding fertility fixed while setting longevity
parameters pij,t to their baseline values, and by holding longevity fixed while setting fertility parameters γ
i
L,t
to their baseline values, respectively. Column 4 corresponds to the baseline (Section 3.2). In column 5 (right
axis), demographic parameters in all countries are set to the population-weighted world average.
(‘longevity only’). Compared to the ‘no aging’ experiment, the fit of the model improves very
slightly—the distance between model and data remains large and the regression coefficient
is barely significant. Hence, rising longevity on its own does not explain much of the cross-
sectional dispersion in capital flows. Conversely, keeping survival probabilities fixed at their
1950 values in each country, we let fertility evolve as in the data. The model’s fit improves
significantly, with a slope coefficient close to unity. However, the distance between model
and data remains higher than in our baseline—with an R2 around 30% compared to 40% in
the baseline. Taken together, these findings establish the primary importance of the fertility
decline for our results, but also indicate the relevance of rising longevity when combined with
changes in fertility. As the fraction of middle-aged individuals in the economy increases after a
drop in fertility, the rise in life expectancy has a more significant impact on aggregate savings.
Country-Specific vs. Global Aging. Last, we consider an experiment where all countries share
the same demographics, reflecting the world average fertility and mortality rates. Shutting
down demographic differences across countries isolates the effect of global aging on capital
flows and reveals the importance of country-specific aging patterns for our results. In this
counterfactual, capital flows massively from developing to developed countries (Figure 3.6,
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(a) No Aging
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(b) Common Aging
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(c) No Credit Constraints
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(d) Symmetric Constraints/Social Security
Figure 3.6: Between Variation under Alternative Calibrations.
Notes: In each panel, the x-coordinate (resp. y-coordinate) for a given country in the scatter plot corresponds
to the average current account over GDP predicted by the model (resp. observed in the data) over 1990-2015.
Model and data are demeaned in each period. The solid (grey) line is the 45 degree line and the dashed
(red) line is the regression line. In panels (a) and (b), model predictions are obtained by holding demographic
parameters constant to their 1950 values in each country, and for common demographic parameters across
countries reflecting world average evolutions, respectively; other parameters are set to their baseline values.
In panels (c) and (d), model predictions are obtained by removing credit constraints, and by setting credit
constraint and social security parameters to their U.S. values in all countries, respectively, other parameters
being set to their baseline values.
panel (b)), echoing the results of Propositions 1 and 2.44 Although this experiment captures
some of the uphill flows observed in the recent period (see countries in the upper-right and
bottom-left quadrants of the panel), it counterfactually predicts that the average developing
country is a capital exporter. Hence, the estimated slope coefficient is negative and the
model’s fit to the data is extremely poor (Figure 3.5, last column). Cross-country differences
in demographics are therefore crucial in matching the downhill flows observed in the data.
44As a result of the increased dispersion in net foreign asset positions caused by global aging, uphill flows
are almost twice as large in this experiment as they would be if the world were not aging.
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Figure 3.7: The Role of Credit Constraints and Social Security: Performance Summary.
Notes: For each calibration, the top panel shows the estimate of the slope coefficient in (18) along with its 5%
confidence interval, while the bottom panel displays the distance between model and data as defined by (19).
Model and data are averaged in the between dimension. Model predictions are obtained under the baseline
calibration, in the absence of credit constraints (θ = ∞), in the absence of social security (% = 0), and when
credit constraint and social security parameters are set to their U.S. values in all countries (last column).
The Role of Credit Constraints and Social Security. In another set of experiments,
we assess the importance for our results of combining worldwide aging with (heterogeneous)
credit markets and social security. Keeping demographic parameters at their baseline values,
we first remove credit constraints in all countries. In this simulation, predicted capital flows
are overly dispersed compared to the data (Figure 3.6, panel (c)). The model implies too
much borrowing by debtor countries and, via a general equilibrium effect, too much lending
by creditors. In particular, the model generates excessively large external deficits in young
emerging countries and—at odds with the data—it also predicts that advanced economies
with highly developed credit markets (such as the U.S.) are creditors. Hence, this model does
significantly worse than our baseline, with a regression coefficient well below unity (Figure 3.7,
column 2). In a second experiment, we shut down social security in all countries (% = 0). In
this simulation, regions characterized by generous pension systems (e.g., Old Europe/Japan,
Central and Eastern Europe) export much more capital than in the data, whereas emerging
countries with less generous pensions end up borrowing more heavily—again generating too
much dispersion relative to the data.45
Finally, we consider a last experiment where all countries have the same level of credit
45The scatter plot illustrating the model’s fit to the data for this calibration is provided in Appendix D.
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market and social security development as the U.S. (Figure 3.7, last column). In this coun-
terfactual, capital flows are exclusively driven by cross-country differences in demographics.
The fit between model and data is much worse than in our baseline, as the model essentially
generates (excessive) downhill flows towards younger countries and countries that are expected
to age more slowly (Figure 3.6, panel (d)).
Summary. These counterfactual experiments establish the crucial role played by worldwide
demographic evolutions in the model’s ability to qualitatively and quantitatively account for
the patterns of capital flows seen in the data. While cross-country differences in demographics
are key to generate capital flows towards younger developing economies, worldwide aging—in
combination with heterogeneous credit constraints and social security—is essential to match
the magnitude of these downhill flows, and to generate some uphill flows towards advanced
economies with highly developed credit markets and/or more generous pension systems.
4 Sensitivity and Extensions
This section explores the sensitivity of our baseline quantitative results along several dimen-
sions. In particular, we consider alternative calibrations of the model that incorporate time
variation in credit constraints and replacement rates.
4.1 Sensitivity Analysis
First, we assess the sensitivity of the model’s performance with respect to the value of the
e.i.s. coefficient, the level of credit constraints, and the measure of country-specific replacement
rates. We also discuss the impact on our quantitative results of excluding observations when
countries have a very low degree of financial openness.
Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution. To the extent that it affects the strength of the
equilibrium adjustment of the world interest rate to global aging—and thereby cross-country
differences in their saving response to aging—the value of the elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution (σ) matters quantitatively. Given the range of empirical estimates in the literature,
we investigate the predictions of our model with a lower e.i.s. (σ = 0.25) and a higher e.i.s.
(σ = 0.75), in the lower and upper range of empirical estimates. For comparison, we also
show results for σ = 1 and for values of the e.i.s. above 1.
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Figure 4.1: Sensitivity with Respect to the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution.
Notes: For each calibration, the top panel shows the estimate of the regression coefficient in (18) along with
its 5% confidence interval, while the bottom panel displays the distance between model and data as defined
by (19). Model and data are averaged in the between dimension. Model predictions are obtained for different
values of the e.i.s. coefficient σ. All other parameters are set to their baseline values, as per Section 3.2.
Figure 4.1 summarizes the performance of the model under these alternative calibrations,
focusing on the between dimension (results for other specifications are qualitatively similar).
As observed in the figure, the model’s ability to account for worldwide capital flows is robust
as long as the e.i.s. coefficient does not exceed 1. For an e.i.s. between 0.25 and 0.75, the
slope coefficient γ is not significantly different from unity (although the point estimate is
closer to unity for a lower σ) and the distance between model and data is not much affected.
For higher values of the e.i.s., the performance of the model deteriorates: the estimated γ is
significantly below unity and the distance between model and data increases. As shown in
Figure 3.4, the world interest rate adjustment to demographic changes is smaller for higher
values of σ—and cross-country differences in saving responses to world aging are dampened
as a result.46 Conversely, the fall in the world interest is reinforced for lower values of the
e.i.s.: for σ = 0.25, the model explains almost all of the fall observed in the data since 1990.
Credit Constraint Parameters and Replacement Rates. To analyze the sensitivity
of our results with respect to the overall level of credit constraints, we consider simulations
46For higher values of the e.i.s., the model wrongly predicts Anglo-Saxon countries to be large creditors and
fails to reproduce the uphill flows observed in the data. See between scatter plot for σ = 2 in Figure D.2.
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Figure 4.2: Sensitivity with Respect to Credit Constraint and Social Security Parameters.
Notes: For each calibration, the top panel shows the estimate of the regression coefficient in (18) along with
its 5% confidence interval, while the bottom panel displays the distance between model and data as defined
by (19). Model and data are averaged in the between dimension. Model predictions are obtained under the
baseline calibration, with tighter or looser credit constraints (parameters θi being set 50% below baseline in
the ‘low θ’ experiment and 50% above in the ‘high θ’ experiment), and with country-specific replacement rates
computed using the coverage of beneficiaries, %B , and of contributors, %C (see Appendix C.5 for a detailed
description of social security data). All other parameters are set to their baseline values, as per Section 3.2.
in which the country-specific parameters θi are set 50% below and 50% above their baseline
values. The model’s performance under these alternative calibrations is shown in Figure 4.2
(columns 2 and 3, respectively) for the between variation. Relative to the baseline, estimates
of the slope coefficient γ are barely affected, but the distance between model and data increases
significantly when credit constraints are loosened in all countries. To better match the data, it
thus seems important to have rather tight credit constraints globally, although cross-sectional
heterogeneity in their level is also key to the model’s success (Figure 3.7). We investigate
as well the robustness of our findings to alternative measures of replacement rates. Namely,
we consider the country-specific replacement rates %iB and %
i
C defined in Section 3.2, obtained
by using either the percentage of retired receiving pension benefits (%B) or the percentage of
contributors in the working-age population (%C) to adjust official replacement rates for social
security coverage. Results are barely affected (Figure 4.2, columns 4 and 5).
Capital Account Restrictions. Our baseline experiment assumes that all countries in the
sample are fully integrated financially from 1980 onwards. In reality, while many countries
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lifted capital account restrictions in the 1970s and 1980s, quite a few developing countries
did so progressively and remained fairly closed to capital account transactions until the mid-
1990s (Chinn and Ito (2008)). This may explain the poor performance of the model in the
1990 cross section (Figure 3.1, column 2). As a sensitivity check, we remove country-year
observations for which the Chinn and Ito capital account openness index (kaopenit) takes its
lowest possible value—leaving us with 373 observations instead of 402.47 While results are
essentially unaffected for other years, the fit between model and data is significantly better
for the 1990 cross section: the estimated slope coefficient γ becomes not statistically different
from 1, and the distance metric falls by 23%.
4.2 Time-Varying Credit Constraints and Social Security
Time-Varying Credit Constraints. Our baseline calibration assumes a constant level of
credit constraints over the entire period, focusing only on cross-country heterogeneity. As a
result, the model does not match the worldwide increase in household debt observed in the
data until the 2007-2009 financial crisis, nor the subsequent fall. To capture this pattern,
we feed the model with an exogenous worldwide increase in the credit supply followed by
a contraction. To do so, at each date, country-specific credit constraint parameters θi are
multiplied by a world credit supply shifter, θt.
48 The evolution of this time-varying parameter,
normalized to one in 2005, is set to match the growth rate of household debt over GDP in
the U.S. over the period 1980-2015. In this experiment, a worldwide credit boom precedes
a phase of deleveraging in the recent period. The model’s fit to capital flows data improves
substantially: in the between dimension, the distance measure falls by 10% and the R2 of the
regression reaches 47%.49
Time-Varying Replacement Rates. Our baseline experiment assumes that, when con-
fronted with population aging, countries adjust their contribution rates in order for the social
security system to remain balanced—while replacement rates are held constant. The lack of
times-series data for a large cross section of countries prevents us from fully calibrating the
47Specifically, 14 observations are excluded in 1990, 5 in 1995, 2 in 2000, 3 in 2010, and 5 in 2015. In the
early 1990s, most excluded observations are for Central and Eastern European countries.
48That is, we set θit = θtθ
i, where θi is as in the baseline (based on household debt over GDP in country i
relative to the U.S. in 2005) and θ2005 = 1. This calibration assumes that the speed of financial development
over the period is common across countries. See Appendix D.3 for further details.
49In all specifications but the 2005 cross section, the distance measure between model and data is reduced,
with the largest improvement for the 2015 cross section.
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model to the realized path of social security adjustments. However, we perform sensitivity
analysis with respect to the adjustment of the generosity of pensions to aging, under the
assumption that the form of the adjustment is common across countries. Specifically, in the
spirit of Section 2, we assume that aging triggers a fall in the replacement rate according to
log(%it) = log(%
i
2005)− (1− ε) log
(
OldDepit
OldDepi2005
)
, (20)
where %i2005 denotes the replacement rate in country i in 2005 as constructed from the data,
OldDepit measures the old-dependency ratio (population above 65 divided by the number of
individuals aged 20-65) in country i at date t, and (1 − ε) captures the downward elasticity
of replacement rates to population aging.50 In our baseline calibration, replacement rates do
not adjust to population aging, which corresponds to the case ε = 1. We perform sensitivity
analysis using values for ε between 0 and 1. Figure D.4 in Appendix D shows that, as
one reduces ε from its baseline value of 1 towards 0, the distance between model and data
increases monotonously, although moderately. Even if half of the social security adjustment
goes through lower replacement rates (ε = 0.5), the estimated slope coefficient γ remains
not statistically different from unity (in the between dimension and other specifications).
Hence, the model’s quantitative performance is robust as long as a substantial fraction of
the adjustment occurs through higher contribution rates, rather than going entirely through
a reduction in replacement rates.51 In particular, for higher values of ε, the model is better
able to match current account deficits in South and Eastern European countries with highly
generous pension systems, in accord with the analysis of Section 2.2 (Proposition 2).
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a multi-country overlapping generations model where countries differ in
their aging prospects and in their access to credit markets and social security. In this model,
global aging can be a potent driver of capital flows as the response of savings to a common
demographic trend differs across countries. In particular, global aging can generate uphill
capital flows—whereby emerging countries export capital to more advanced economies, which
50Consistent with the notation of Section 2, the parameter ε captures the elasticity of contribution rates to
population aging. For countries that have fully private systems in 2005 (implying that %i2005 = 0), %
i
t is set
equal to zero at all dates.
51A scatter plot illustrating the model’s fit to the data for ε = 0 is provided in Appendix D (Figure D.5).
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have more developed financial markets and a broader social security coverage. Differences in
aging patterns across countries also trigger capital flows, which are typically going downhill:
emerging markets that are aging at a slower pace are importing capital. By combining these
two forces, our framework can account for the substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity in the
direction and magnitude of capital flows among emerging and advanced economies.
The quantitative assessment of the theory on a large sample of emerging and advanced
economies establishes the relevance of these mechanisms in understanding the international al-
location of capital. Given the calibrated heterogeneity in credit constraints and social security,
we find that worldwide demographic evolutions explain about a third of the cross-sectional
dispersion of capital flows, and model-implied flows move one-for-one with the data. Overall,
the model does remarkably well in reproducing the patterns of capital flows observed across
countries, both emerging and developed, over the last three decades.
A common view on the global allocation of capital is that emerging countries do not seem
to import enough capital, in particular the fast-growing ones (Lucas (1990), Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2013)). Our findings indicate that, when focusing on demographics as a driver of cap-
ital flows—to the extent that countries differ in their ability to transfer resources over time
and across generations—the data are in line with the predictions of the theory. Our frame-
work provides a natural starting point to further study the efficiency of the global allocation
of capital and understand why some fast-growing emerging countries act as capital exporters.
If countries that experience high productivity growth are also aging faster on average, demo-
graphics could help explain this ‘allocation puzzle’. Furthermore, the non-Ricardian nature of
our environment can be useful to understand the role played by the public sector in shaping
capital flows (Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2014)). We leave a careful examination
of these important questions for future research.
Policy makers across the world are concerned with the implications of population aging.
Our work sheds light on some of the issues at stake and opens the possibility for a number of
policy counterfactuals on external imbalances—e.g., to assess the impact of pension system
adjustments in some large economies on the global allocation of capital and the return to
capital. Our multi-country quantitative model would be well-suited for this type of analysis.
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A Appendix to Section 2
This appendix contains the proofs of the propositions derived in Section 2 of the paper,
along with additional material. Section A.0 analyzes the determinants of autarky interest
rates. Sections A.1–A.3 correspond to Sections 2.1–2.3 of the paper. Section A.4 contains
supplementary figures.
A.0 Autarky Equilibrium
To start with, we derive the law of motion that governs the dynamics of an economy under
autarky (for notational convenience, we drop the country superscript throughout this section).
Total asset holdings in period t are given by
Wt ≡ Ly,tay,t + Lm,tam,t.
Under the assumption that the credit constraint is binding (see Remark A-1 below), the asset
holdings of the young are given by
ay,t = −θtwt+1
Rt+1
. (A-1)
To obtain the optimal asset holdings of the middle-aged, we combine (4)–(6) together with
the first-order optimality condition with respect to middle age consumption in period t,
(co,t+1)
1/σ = βpt
Rt+1
pt
(cm,t)
1/σ = βRt+1(cm,t)
1/σ,
which yields (7). It follows that
Wt = −Ly,tθtwt+1
Rt+1
+ Lm,t
[
pt(1− τt − θt−1)
pt + β−σR1−σt+1
wt − β
−σR1−σt+1
pt + β−σR1−σt+1
pt%t+1wt
Rt+1
]
= Lm,t
[
−nt−1θtwt+1
Rt+1
+
pt(1− τt − θt−1)
pt + β−σR1−σt+1
wt − β
−σR1−σt+1
pt + β−σR1−σt+1
nt−1τt+1wt+1
Rt+1
]
= AtLm,t
[
pt(1− τt − θt−1)
pt + β−σR1−σt+1
(1− α)kαt
− nt−1(1 + γA,t+1)1− α
α
(
θt +
β−σR1−σt+1
pt + β−σR1−σt+1
τt+1
)
kt+1
]
, (A-2)
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where the second equality uses Ly,t = nt−1Lm,t as well as the social security balanced budget
constraint (2), and the last equality uses (1) to substitute for the interest rate and wages.
Market clearing requires that Wt = Kt+1. Given the fact that Kt+1 = At+1Lm,t+1kt+1 =
nt−1(1 + γA,t+1)AtLm,tkt+1, this condition is equivalent to
nt−1(1 + γA,t+1)
[
1 +
1− α
α
(
θt +
β−σR1−σt+1
pt + β−σR1−σt+1
τt+1
)]
kt+1
=
pt(1− τt − θt−1)
pt + β−σR1−σt+1
(1− α)kαt . (A-3)
Remark A-1. The expression (A-1) for the asset holdings of the young assumes that the credit
constraint is binding. The constraint faced by a young household in period t is indeed binding
if their optimal consumption level c∗y,t in the absence of constraint is such that c
∗
y,t > θtwt/Rt+1.
Solving the household’s unconstrained optimization problem, this condition can be written as
θt <
1− τt+1 + pt+1%t+2Rt+2
1 + βσRσ−1t+1 + pt+1β2σ(Rt+1Rt+2)σ−1
. (A-4)
In the special case where σ = 1 and τt+1 = %t+2 = 0, the condition simplifies to:
θt <
1
1 + β + β2pt+1
.
We proceed under the assumption that parameter values are such that (A-4) is satisfied in all
periods, which we check in all the numerical illustrations. See also Remark A-3 for a discussion
of this condition in the autarky steady state.
In what follows, we consider a steady-state configuration in which all parameters are
constant, that is
nt = n, pt = p, γA,t = γA, θt = θ, and τt = τ,
implying a constant replacement rate
% =
n
p
(1 + γA)τ. (A-5)
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Furthermore, we impose the following restrictions on parameter values
α ∈ ]0, 1[, β ∈ ]0, 1], σ ∈ ]0, 1], p ∈ ]0, 1],
n > 0, γA ≥ 0, θ ≥ 0, τ ≥ 0 and θ + τ < 1.
Although not needed for our derivations, it is natural to assume that n ≥ 1, so that the
population size does not tend to zero over time. Note that a fertility rate of n in the model
should be interpreted as a fertility rate of 2n in practice.
Lemma A-1. Under the assumptions stated above, the economy converges to a unique steady
state, in which the interest rate R ≡ R(n, p, γA, θ, τ, α, β, σ) satisfies
R =
n(1 + γA)
p(1− τ − θ)
[
p
(
α
1− α + θ
)
+ β−σR1−σ
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)]
. (A-6)
The interest rate is increasing in the ease of credit access θ and in the level of social security τ .
Proof: Under the constant parameter assumption, (A-3) becomes
n(1 + γA)
[
1 +
1− α
α
(
θ +
β−σR1−σt+1
p+ β−σR1−σt+1
τ
)]
kt+1 =
p(1− τ − θ)
p+ β−σR1−σt+1
(1− α)kαt . (A-7)
Using the identity kt+1 = αk
α
t+1/Rt+1 implied by (1), this can be rewritten as
n(1 + γA)
(
p+ β−σR1−σt+1
)
p(1− τ − θ)Rt+1
(
α
1− α + θ +
β−σR1−σt+1
p+ β−σR1−σt+1
τ
)
=
(
kt
kt+1
)α
,
which is equivalent to
n(1 + γA)
p(1− τ − θ)
[
p
(
α
1−α + θ
)
Rt+1
+
β−σ
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
Rσt+1
]
=
(
Rt+1
Rt
) α
1−α
. (A-8)
Existence and Uniqueness. In view of (A-8), if a steady state exists, the steady-state value of
the interest rate, R, must be such that
n(1 + γA)
p(1− τ − θ)
[
p
(
α
1−α + θ
)
R
+
β−σ
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
Rσ
]
= 1. (A-9)
The left-hand side of the equation is strictly decreasing in R, goes to ∞ as R ↓ 0, and
converges to zero as R → ∞. Hence, (A-9) admits a unique solution, which pins down the
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steady-state interest rate R = R(n, p, γA, θ, τ ;α, β, σ) ∈ ]0,∞[. The steady-state value of the
capital-effective-labor ratio is given by
k =
(
α/R
)1/(1−α)
.
The implicit definition (A-6) follows immediately from (A-9). In the special case σ = 1, the
steady-state interest rate admits the explicit expression
R =
n(1 + γA)
βp(1− τ − θ)
[
(1 + βp)
(
α
1− α + θ
)
+ τ
]
. (A-10)
For future reference, we note that (A-9) implies the inequalities
n(1 + γA)
(1− τ − θ)R
(
α
1− α + θ
)
< 1, (A-11)
and
n(1 + γA)
p(1− τ − θ)
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
(βR)−σ < 1. (A-12)
Convergence. The transition dynamics of the interest rate is determined implicitly by the
difference equation (A-8), which we rewrite here in the form
n(1 + γA)
p(1− τ − θ)
[
p
(
α
1−α + θ
)
Rt+1
+
β−σ
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
Rσt+1
]
−
(
Rt+1
Rt
) α
1−α
= 0. (A-13)
For a given value of Rt > 0, the left-hand side of the equation is strictly decreasing in Rt+1,
goes to ∞ as Rt+1 ↓ 0, and goes to −∞ in the limit Rt+1 →∞. Hence, there exists a unique
solution Rt+1 ∈ ]0,∞[. Suppose that R < Rt. Using (A-9), it is immediate to see that the
left-hand side of (A-13) evaluated at Rt+1 = R is strictly positive. Likewise, the left-hand side
of (A-13) evaluated at Rt+1 = Rt is strictly negative. Therefore, Rt+1 ∈ ]R,Rt[. A similar
argument establishes that, if Rt < R, then Rt+1 ∈ ]Rt, R[.
Comparative Statics. Differentiating (A-9) written as
p(1− τ − θ)R = n(1 + γA)
[
p
(
α
1− α + θ
)
+ β−σR1−σ
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)]
(A-14)
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with respect to R and θ yields
∂R
∂θ
=
pR + n(1 + γA)
(
p+ β−σR1−σ
)
p(1− τ − θ)− θ(1− σ)n(1 + γA)(βR)−σ > 0, (A-15)
where the inequality follows from (A-12), according to which
p(1− τ − θ)− θ(1− σ)n(1 + γA)(βR)−σ > p(1− τ − θ)
[
1− (1− σ)θ
θ + τ + α
1−α
]
> 0.
Likewise, differentiating (A-14) with respect to R and τ yields
∂R
∂τ
=
p+ n(1 + γA)(βR)
−σ
p(1− τ − θ)− τ(1− σ)n(1 + γA)(βR)−σR > 0, (A-16)
where the sign of the expression is again established by using (A-12).
Remark A-2. It is useful to also determine the dependence of the equilibrium steady-state
interest rate with respect to the e.i.s. coefficient. To do so, we differentiate (A-14) with respect
to R and σ. Noting that
d
(
β−σR1−σ
)
= − ln(βR)β−σR1−σ dσ + (1− σ)(βR)−σ dR,
we obtain
∂R
∂σ
= − n(1 + γA)
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
β−σR1−σ
p(1− τ − θ)− (1− σ)n(1 + γA)
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
(βR)−σ
ln(βR). (A-17)
Since (A-12) implies that
p(1− τ − θ)− (1− σ)n(1 + γA)
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
(βR)−σ > σp(1− τ − θ) > 0,
it is immediate to see that ∂R/∂σ < 0 if and only if βR > 1. Since the left-hand side of (A-9)
is strictly decreasing in R, the inequality R > 1/β holds if and only if the evaluation of its
expression at R = 1/β is strictly greater than one, which is equivalent to
n(1 + γA)
p(1− τ − θ)
[
(1 + βp)
(
α
1− α + θ
)
+ τ
]
> 1. (A-18)
Intuitively, the condition βR > 1 ensures that the middle-aged tilt their consumption upwards.
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The negative impact of σ on R arises because a higher e.i.s. increases their willingness to
postpone consumption through savings. Condition (A-18) constitutes a very mild restriction
on parameter values. The left-hand side of the inequality is increasing in n, γA, θ, τ , α, and
β, and decreasing in p. For β = 0.96 (annual), γA = 1% (annual), and α = 1/3, the inequality
remains satisfied under the unfavorable assumption that θ = τ = 0, n = 1.1, and p = 0.9,
assuming a 25-year period.
Remark A-3. In the steady state, the credit constraint on the young binds if and only if
θ <
1− τ + n(1+γA)τ
R
1 + βσRσ−1 + pβ2σR2(σ−1)
(A-19)
For any given value of τ ∈ [0, 1[, one can show that the following statements hold.
i. If σ ∈ ]0, 1/2[ and α ≥ 1/4, (A-19) is satisfied for all θ < 1− τ .
ii. If σ = 1/2 and n(1 + γA) ≥ 1, (A-19) is satisfied for all θ < 1− τ .
iii. If σ ∈ ]1/2, 1], there exists a unique point θ† ∈ ]0, 1− τ [ such that (A-19) is satisfied if
and only if θ < θ†.
Hence, when σ ≤ 1/2, the assumption that the credit constraint on the young is binding is
automatically satisfied under weak restrictions on parameter values. When 1/2 < σ ≤ 1,
this assumption implicitly imposes an upper bound on θ. The threshold θ† is such that
R(n, p, γA, θ†, τ ;α, β, σ) coincides with the interest rate R? that would prevail in an economy
without credit constraint. The proof of these statements is available upon request.
Next, we characterize the impact of demographic changes on the equilibrium steady-state
interest rate. Our analysis assumes that the steady-state contribution rate τ is an isoelastic
function of the old-dependency ratio p/n with
−∂τ/τ
∂n/n
=
∂τ/τ
∂p/p
= ε, ε ≥ 0.
Lemma A-2. The steady-state interest rate R is increasing in fertility and decreasing in
longevity if τ < τ†, where the threshold τ† ≡ τ†(n, p, γA, θ, α, β, σ, ε) is defined by (A-30).
Furthermore, when condition (A-18) holds, the interest rate response to demographic changes
is stronger when the e.i.s. coefficient σ is lower.
52
Proof: We start from (A-9), which we rewrite as
p(1− τ − θ)R = n(1 + γA)
[
p
(
α
1− α + θ
)
+ β−σR1−σ
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)]
. (A-20)
In order to compute the sensitivity of the interest rate R with respect to the fertility rate n,
we differentiate this equation with respect to n, R, and τ . Taking into account the fact that
∂τ/τ
∂n/n
= −ε, i.e., dτ = −ετ
n
dn,
we obtain
[
p(1− τ − θ)− (1− σ)n(1 + γA)
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
(βR)−σ
]
dR
= (1 + γA)
[
p
(
α
1− α + θ
)
+ β−σR1−σ
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)]
dn
− ετ
n
(
pR + n(1 + γA)β
−σR1−σ
)
dn. (A-21)
Since (A-12) implies that
p(1− τ − θ)− (1− σ)n(1 + γA)
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
(βR)−σ > 0,
it is immediate to see that the inequality ∂R/∂n > 0 holds if and only if
n(1 + γA)
[
α
1− α + θ +
β−σR1−σ
p
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)]
−ετ
(
R +
n(1 + γA)
p
β−σR1−σ
)
> 0. (A-22)
In particular, this condition is trivially satisfied when τ = 0 or ε = 0. More generally, using
(A-20) and (A-21), we can write
∂R
∂n
=
1
n
×
p(1− τ − θ)R− ετ
(
pR + n(1 + γA)β
−σR1−σ
)
p(1− τ − θ)− (1− σ)n(1 + γA)
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
(βR)−σ
. (A-23)
Likewise, in order to compute the sensitivity of the interest rate to the survival probability,
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we differentiate (A-20) with respect to p, R, and τ . Taking into account the fact that
∂τ/τ
∂p/p
= ε, i.e., dτ =
ετ
p
dp,
we obtain
[
p(1− τ − θ)− (1− σ)n(1 + γA)
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
(βR)−σ
]
dR
=
[
n(1 + γA)
(
α
1− α + θ
)
− (1− τ − θ)R
]
dp+
ετ
p
(
pR + n(1 + γA)β
−σR1−σ
)
dp. (A-24)
The term that multiplies dR is positive per (A-12), as above. Hence, the inequality ∂R/∂p < 0
holds if and only if the condition
(1− τ − θ)R− n(1 + γA)
(
α
1− α + θ
)
− ετ
(
R +
n(1 + γA)
p
β−σR1−σ
)
> 0
holds. Using the fact that
(1− τ − θ)R− n(1 + γA)
(
α
1− α + θ
)
=
n(1 + γA)
p
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
β−σR1−σ,
which follows from (A-20), the latter condition is equivalent to
n(1 + γA)
p
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
β−σR1−σ − ετ
(
R +
n(1 + γA)
p
β−σR1−σ
)
> 0. (A-25)
Again, this condition is trivially satisfied when τ = 0 or ε = 0. More generally, we can write
∂R
∂p
= −1
p
×
n(1+γA)
p
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
β−σR1−σ − ετ
(
R + n(1+γA)
p
β−σR1−σ
)
(1− τ − θ)− (1− σ)n(1+γA)
p
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
(βR)−σ
. (A-26)
Thresholds. The difference between the left-hand sides of (A-22) and (A-25) is equal to
n(1 + γA)
(
α
1− α + θ
)
> 0,
which implies that, if (A-25) holds, then (A-22) holds as well. Moreover, multiplying (A-25)
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by pβσRσ−1, it is immediate to see that this condition is equivalent to
n(1 + γA)
n(1 + γA) + p(βR)σ
− ε τα
1−α + θ + τ
> 0. (A-27)
For the remainder of this paragraph, suppose that ε > 0. Then (A-27) implicitly defines
an upper bound on τ . Indeed, the left-hand side of the inequality is strictly decreasing in τ ,
converges to a strictly positive number as τ ↓ 0, and to a strictly negative number as τ ↑ (1−θ).
Hence, there exists a unique point τp ≡ τp(n, p, γA, θ;α, β, σ, ε) ∈ ]0, 1− θ[ such that (A-27) is
satisfied if and only if τ < τp. Furthermore, the analysis above implies that
τ < τp ⇔ ∂R
∂p
< 0 and τ < τp ⇒ ∂R
∂n
> 0. (A-28)
Starting from (A-22), one can show in a similar way that there exists a unique point τn ∈
]τp, 1 − θ[ such that ∂R/∂n > 0 holds if and only if τ < τn. Both τn and τp are strictly
decreasing in ε, with limit 1 − θ as ε ↓ 0, and zero as ε → ∞. Hence, one can alternatively
characterize the response of the interest rate to changes in demographic variables in terms of
the elasticity of the contribution rate. For any τ ∈ ]0, 1−θ[, there exists a unique point εˆn > 0
(resp. εˆp > 0) such that
∂R
∂n
> 0 ⇔ ε < εˆn
(
resp.
∂R
∂p
< 0 ⇔ ε < εˆp
)
. (A-29)
Threshold τ†. To provide a unified treatment of the cases where ε = 0 and ε > 0, we introduce
the threshold τ† ≡ τ†(n, p, γA, θ;α, β, σ, ε) defined as
τ† = sup
{
τ ∈ [0, 1− θ[
∣∣∣∣ n(1 + γA)n(1 + γA) + p[βR(τ)]σ − ε τα1−α + θ + τ > 0
}
. (A-30)
By definition, when ε = 0, then τ† = 1− θ; and when instead ε > 0, then τ† = τp ∈ ]0, 1− θ[.
The first part of Lemma A-2 follows immediately from (A-28), and from the observation that
the inequalities (A-22) and (A-25) hold for ε = 0.
Figure A.1 in Section A.4 of the appendix illustrates the magnitude of the threshold τ† as a
function of parameter values.
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A Special Case. In the particular case when σ = 1, the inequality (A-27) can be written as
P (τ) ≡ −τ 2 + χ1τ + χ0 > 0, where
χ1 = 1− 2θ − α
1− α − ε
[
1
1− α + βp
(
α
1− α + θ
)]
,
χ0 = (1− θ)
(
α
1− α + θ
)
.
In this case, τ† is equal to the positive root of the quadratic equation P (τ) = 0, namely,
τ† =
χ1 +
√
χ21 + 4χ0
2
=: ν(p, θ;α, β, ε). (A-31)
In particular, one can check that ν is decreasing in ε, is equal to 1− θ for ε = 0, and is such
that ν ∈ ]0, 1− θ[ for ε > 0.
Explicit Lower Bound for τ†. In view of (A-27), the threshold value τ† is decreasing in σ if
and only if
∂
∂σ
(
βσR(σ)σ
)
> 0,
where we write R(σ) to make explicit the dependence of R on σ. The left-hand side of the
inequality can be expressed as
∂
∂σ
(
βσR(σ)σ
)
=
(
ln(βR) +
∂R
∂σ
σ
R
)
(βR)σ.
Moreover, using (A-17), we obtain
ln(βR) +
∂R
∂σ
σ
R
=
[
1− σn(1 + γA)
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
(βR)−σ
p(1− τ − θ)− (1− σ)n(1 + γA)
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
(βR)−σ
]
ln(βR).
Hence, one can see that, when βR > 1, the inequality ∂(βσR(σ)σ)/∂σ > 0 holds if and only if
p(1− τ − θ)− n(1 + γA)
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
(βR)−σ > 0,
which is indeed satisfied per (A-12). Therefore, under condition (A-18), τ† is decreasing in σ,
in which case the closed-form expression in (A-31) provides a lower bound for τ† when σ < 1.
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Dependence of ∂R/∂n and ∂R/∂p in σ. Next, we analyze how the response of the interest rate
to a change in demographic variables is affected by the value of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, σ. To do so, we compute
∂
∂σ
(
∂R
∂x
)
=
∂
∂x
(
∂R
∂σ
)
, for x = n, p,
by differentiating the expression for ∂R/∂σ in (A-17) with respect to n and p. Let us define
N ≡ n(1 + γA)
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
β−σR1−σ > 0 (A-32)
D ≡ p(1− τ − θ)− (1− σ)n(1 + γA)
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
(βR)−σ > 0. (A-33)
In view of the expression for ∂R/∂σ in (A-17), we compute
∂
∂n
(
∂R
∂σ
)
= − ∂
∂n
(
ln(βR)× N
D
)
= −
(
R′
R
× N
D
+ ln(βR)× N
′D −ND′
D2
)
= − 1
D2
(
(DR′)× N
R
+ ln(βR)× (N ′D −ND′)
)
, (A-34)
where we use the abbreviated notations R′ = ∂R/∂n, N ′ = ∂N/∂n, and D′ = ∂D/∂n.
Proceeding under the assumption that condition (A-18) holds and τ < τ†, we now show that
the expression in (A-34) is negative. We have shown that, if τ < τ†, then R′ > 0, which
implies that (DR′)× (N/R) > 0. Furthermore, differentiating (A-32) and (A-33) with respect
to n, we obtain
N ′ = (1 + γA)
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
β−σ
[
R1−σ + n(1− σ)R−σ ×R′] (A-35)
D′ = −(1− σ)(1 + γA)
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
β−σ
[
R−σ − nσR−σ−1 ×R′], (A-36)
Using these expressions as well as (A-32)–(A-33), we compute
N ′D −ND′ = n(1 + γA)2
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)2
(βR)−σ
×
[
α
1−α + θ
α
1−α + θ + τ
p
(
1 + (1− σ)ηn
)
+ β−σR1−σ
]
> 0, (A-37)
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where ηn ≡ (∂R/R)/(∂n/n) = R′×(n/R) > 0. Since condition (A-18) ensures that ln(βR) > 0
(see Remark A-2), we conclude, in view of (A-34), that
∂
∂σ
(
∂R
∂n
)
=
∂
∂n
(
∂R
∂σ
)
< 0. (A-38)
Similarly, given the quantities N and D defined by (A-32)–(A-33), and now using the
abbreviated notations R′ = ∂R/∂p, N ′ = ∂N/∂p, and D′ = ∂D/∂p, we obtain
∂
∂p
(
∂R
∂σ
)
=
1
D2
(
−(DR′)× N
R
+ ln(βR)× (ND′ −N ′D)
)
. (A-39)
We have shown that, if τ < τ†, then R′ < 0, which implies that −(DR′) × (N/R) > 0.
Furthermore, differentiating (A-32) and (A-33) with respect to p, we obtain
N ′ = n(1 + γA)
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
(1− σ)(βR)−σ ×R′ (A-40)
D′ = (1− τ − θ) + σ(1− σ)n(1 + γA)
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
β−σR−σ−1 ×R′, (A-41)
and using (A-32)–(A-33) and (A-40)–(A-41), we compute
ND′ −N ′D = n2(1 + γA)2
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)2
(βR)−σ
×
[
α
1−α + θ
α
1−α + θ + τ
(
1 + (1− σ)ηp
)
+
β−σR1−σ
p
]
> 0, (A-42)
where ηp ≡ −(∂R/R)/(∂p/p) = −R′ × (p/R) > 0. In view of (A-39), we therefore conclude
that, under condition (A-18),
∂
∂σ
(
∂R
∂p
)
=
∂
∂p
(
∂R
∂σ
)
> 0. (A-43)
In Remark A-5 below, we show that the impact of the e.i.s. coefficient σ on the response of
the interest rate to demographic variables also applies to the elasticities of R with respect to
n and p, that is, ∂ηn/∂σ < 0 and −∂ηp/∂σ > 0.
Remark A-4. It is enlightening to rewrite the right-hand side of (A-21) as
(1 + γA)(p+ β
−σR1−σ)
(
α
1− α + θ
)
dn+ pR dτ + pβ−σR1−σ d%, (A-44)
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where dτ = −(ετ/n)dn and d% = ((1 − ε)%/n)dn. This expression allows one to clearly
distinguish the direct impact of fertility on the equilibrium interest rate (first term) from the
indirect impact going through the adjustment of social security (second and third terms). The
latter involves the effect driven by a change in contribution rate (dτ) and the one driven by
a change in replacement rate (d%). Since the sign of ∂R/∂n coincides with the sign of the
expression in (A-44), a sufficient condition for ∂R/∂n > 0 is that the social security channel
reinforces the direct effect of change in fertility, i.e.,
1
dn
(
pR dτ + pβ−σR1−σ d%
)
= −pRετ
n
+ pβ−σR1−σ
(1− ε)%
n
> 0,
which is equivalent to
τ
(
(1− ε)n(1 + γA)β−σR1−σ − εpR
)
> 0.
Rewriting the right-hand side of (A-24), one can show that this condition is also necessary and
sufficient for the social security channel to reinforce the direct effect of a change in longevity.
For the remainder of this remark, we assume that τ > 0, so that the social security channel
operates. Furthermore, noting that the above inequality is trivially satisfied when ε = 0,
and trivially violated when ε ≥ 1, suppose that ε ∈ ]0, 1[. Then, the overall social security
adjustment channel (strictly) contributes to a fall in R in response to aging if and only if
f(ε) :=
ε
1− ε <
n(1 + γA)
p
(
βR(τ)
)−σ
=: g(τ). (A-45)
Recall that R is an increasing function of τ (see Lemma A-1, and (A-16) in particular), which
goes to ∞ in the limit as τ ↑ (1− θ), as revealed by (A-9). Therefore, the right-hand side of
(A-45) is a decreasing function of τ , starting from g(0) > 0 and going to zero in the limit as
τ ↑ (1− θ). The left-hand side is an increasing function of ε, which starts from f(0) = 0 and
goes to infinity as ε ↑ 1. The variations of f and g imply that:
• There exists a unique point ε† ∈ ]0, 1[ such that f(ε†) = g(0). Moreover, if ε ≥ ε†, then
f(ε) ≥ g(τ) for all τ .
• For any ε ∈ ]0, ε†[, there exists a unique point τ ∗(ε) ∈ ]0, 1− θ[ such that f(ε) < g(τ) if
and only if τ < τ ∗(ε). Moreover, τ ∗ is decreasing in ε, with limit (1 − θ) as ε ↓ 0, and
zero as ε ↑ ε†.
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Hence, the following statements hold.
(i) If ε = 0, or if ε ∈ ]0, ε†[ and τ < τ ∗(ε), the social security channel strictly reinforces the
fall in R in response to aging. For any fixed level of τ , this is less likely to occur for
higher values of ε (as the threshold τ ∗ becomes closer to zero), and this never occurs
when ε ≥ ε†. In particular, since ε† < 1, this never occurs when ε ≥ 1.
(ii) In the knife-edge case where ε ∈ ]0, ε†[ and τ = τ ∗(ε), the effects driven by the simul-
taneous adjustment of τ and % play in opposite directions and exactly compensate each
other, so that the overall social security channel is neutral.
(iii) If ε ∈ ]0, ε†[ and τ > τ ∗(ε), the social security channel counteracts the direct impact
of aging on the interest rate—as the effect driven by the rise in the contribution rate
dominates the effect of the cut in the replacement rate.
(iv) If ε ≥ ε† (that is, if ε ∈ [ε†, 1] or ε > 1), the social security channel counteracts the direct
effect of aging, for any level of τ > 0. In particular, when ε > 1, aging is accompanied
by an increase in the replacement rate %, so that the increase in the contribution rate
must compensate for both the rise in the old-dependency ratio and the rise in %. In this
case (ε > 1), the contribution and replacement channels play in the same direction—i.e.,
both dampen the equilibrium fall of the interest rate in response to aging.
In cases (iii) and (iv), aging may still very well be associated with a fall in the interest rate
if the direct effect of demographics dominates the counteracting social security channel. As
shown in the proof of Lemma A-2, this occurs when τ < τ†. That is, when ε ∈ ]0, †[ and
τ ∈ ]τ ∗, τ†[, or when ε ≥ ε† and τ ∈ ]0, τ†[, the equilibrium interest rate falls in response to
aging despite the counteracting effect driven by the social security adjustment.
Remark A-5. It is useful to also express the response of the interest rate to demographic
variables in terms of elasticities. We thus define the quantities
ηn ≡ ∂R/R
∂n/n
and ηp ≡ −∂R/R
∂p/p
. (A-46)
Using (A-23), we compute
ηn =
∂R
∂n
n
R
=
(1− τ − θ)− ετ
(
1 + n(1+γA)
p
(βR)−σ
)
(1− τ − θ)− (1− σ)n(1+γA)
p
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
(βR)−σ
. (A-47)
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Likewise, using (A-26), we compute
ηp = −∂R
∂p
p
R
=
n(1+γA)
p
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
(βR)−σ − ετ
(
1 + n(1+γA)
p
(βR)−σ
)
(1− τ − θ)− (1− σ)n(1+γA)
p
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
(βR)−σ
. (A-48)
It is worthwhile to note in passing that ηn > ηp, since (A-20) implies that
n(1 + γA)
p
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
(βR)−σ = (1− τ − θ)− n(1 + γA)
R
(
α
1− α + θ
)
.
Special Case: Log Utility. In the particular case where σ = 1, using the fact that
n(1 + γA)
pβR
=
1− τ − θ
(1 + βp)
(
α
1−α + θ
)
+ τ
as implied by (A-10), the expressions in (A-47) and (A-48) simplify to
ηn = 1− ετ
(
1
1− τ − θ +
1
(1 + βp)
(
α
1−α + θ
)
+ τ
)
(A-49)
and
ηp =
α
1−α + θ + τ
(1 + βp)
(
α
1−α + θ
)
+ τ
− ετ
(
1
1− τ − θ +
1
(1 + βp)
(
α
1−α + θ
)
+ τ
)
, (A-50)
respectively. When furthermore τ = 0, it is immediate to see that (A-49) and (A-50) become
ηn = 1 and ηp =
1
1 + βp
.
Impact of σ on Elasticities. We now extend the results of Lemma A-2 (see (A-38) and (A-43),
in particular) regarding the impact of the e.i.s. coefficient σ on the magnitude of the interest
rate response to a change in demographic variables. Again, we proceed under the assumption
that condition (A-18) holds and τ < τ†. First, we compute
∂ηn
∂σ
≡ ∂
∂σ
(
∂R/R
∂n/n
)
= n× ∂
∂σ
(
∂R
∂n
× 1
R
)
=
n
R
[
∂
∂σ
(
∂R
∂n
)
− ∂R
∂n
× ∂R
∂σ
× 1
R
]
. (A-51)
Using the notations introduced in (A-32)–(A-33) and (A-35)–(A-36), as well as the expression
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for ∂R/∂σ in (A-17), we write
∂R
∂n
× ∂R
∂σ
× 1
R
= − ln(βR)×R′ × N
DR
,
which, combined with (A-34), implies that
∂
∂σ
(
∂R
∂n
)
− ∂R
∂n
× ∂R
∂σ
× 1
R
= − 1
D2
[
(DR′)× N
R
+ ln(βR)×
(
N ′D −ND′ − (DR′)× N
R
)]
.
If τ < τ† and (A-18) holds, then R′ ≡ ∂R∂n > 0 and ln(βR) > 0. Therefore, in view of (A-51),
N ′D −ND′ − (DR′)× N
R
> 0 ⇒ ∂ηn
∂σ
< 0.
To show that the left inequality holds, we first observe that (A-21) and (A-33) imply that
DR′ = (1 + γA)
[
p
(
α
1− α + θ
)
+ β−σR1−σ
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)]
− ετ
n
(
pR + n(1 + γA)β
−σR1−σ
)
.
Using this expression along with (A-20) and (A-32), we compute
(DR′)× N
R
= p(1− τ − θ)
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
β−σR1−σ
×
[
(1 + γA)− ετ
n
pR + n(1 + γA)β
−σR1−σ
p
(
α
1−α + θ
)
+ β−σR1−σ
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)].
= (1 + γA)
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
(βR)−σ
×
[
p(1− τ − θ)R− ετ
(
pR + n(1 + γA)β
−σR1−σ
)]
.
Moreover, we note that (A-37) implies
N ′D −ND′ = (1 + γA)
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
(βR)−σ
× n(1 + γA)
[
p
(
α
1− α + θ
)(
1 + (1− σ)ηn
)
+
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
β−σR1−σ
]
> (1 + γA)
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
(βR)−σ × p(1− τ − θ)R,
where the inequality follows from (A-20) along with the fact that ηn > 0. Therefore,
N ′D −ND′ − (DR′)N
R
> ετ(1 + γA)
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)(
pR + n(1 + γA)β
−σR1−σ
)
(βR)−σ ≥ 0,
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implying that ∂ηn/∂n < 0. Similarly, we compute
−∂ηp
∂σ
≡ ∂
∂σ
(
∂R/R
∂p/p
)
= p× ∂
∂σ
(
∂R
∂p
× 1
R
)
=
p
R
[
∂
∂σ
(
∂R
∂p
)
− ∂R
∂p
× ∂R
∂σ
× 1
R
]
. (A-52)
Using the notations introduced in (A-32)–(A-33) and (A-40)–(A-41), as well as the expression
for ∂R/∂σ in (A-17), we write
∂R
∂p
× ∂R
∂σ
× 1
R
= − ln(βR)×R′ × N
DR
,
which, combined with (A-39), implies that
∂
∂σ
(
∂R
∂p
)
− ∂R
∂p
× ∂R
∂σ
× 1
R
=
1
D2
[
−(DR′)× N
R
+ ln(βR)×
(
ND′ −N ′D + (DR′)× N
R
)]
.
If τ < τ† and (A-18) holds, then R′ ≡ ∂R∂p < 0 and ln(βR) > 0. Therefore, in view of (A-52),
ND′ −N ′D + (DR′)× N
R
> 0 ⇒ ∂ηp
∂σ
< 0.
To show that the left inequality holds, we note that (A-42) implies that
ND′ −N ′D = n(1 + γA)
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
(βR)−σ
× n(1 + γA)
p
[
p
(
α
1− α + θ
)(
1 + (1− σ)ηp
)
+
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
β−σR1−σ
]
> n(1 + γA)(1− τ − θ)
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
β−σR1−σ,
where the inequality follows from (A-20) along with the fact that ηp = −R′ × (p/R) > 0.
Moreover, (A-26) and (A-33) imply that
DR′ = −1
p
[
n(1 + γA)
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
β−σR1−σ − ετ
(
pR + n(1 + γA)β
−σR1−σ
)]
,
while (A-20) and (A-32) yield
N
R
=
p(1− τ − θ) ( α
1−α + θ + τ
)
β−σR1−σ
p
(
α
1−α + θ
)
+ β−σR1−σ
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
) .
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Therefore, (DR′)× (N/R) is equal to
n(1 + γA)(1− τ − θ)
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)
β−σR1−σ
×
[
−
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
β−σR1−σ
p
(
α
1−α + θ
)
+ β−σR1−σ
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
) + ετ
n(1 + γA)
pR + n(1 + γA)β
−σR1−σ
p
(
α
1−α + θ
)
+ β−σR1−σ
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)] .
It is thus immediate to see that ND′ −N ′D + (DR′)× (N/R) > 0, implying that
∂ηp
∂σ
= − ∂
∂σ
(
∂R/R
∂p/p
)
< 0.
In view of these results, when σ < 1 and (A-18) holds, the closed-form expressions in (A-49)
and (A-50) provide lower bounds for ηn and ηp, respectively. Figures A.2 and A.3 in Section A.4
illustrate the magnitudes of ηn and ηp, respectively, as a function of parameter values.
A.1 Integrated Equilibrium
The proof of Lemma 1 relies heavily on the results derived in the previous section under
financial autarky (see Lemmas A-1 and A-2, in particular). In the derivations that follow, we
consider an integrated steady-state configuration in which
nit = n, p
i
t = p, γ
i
A,t = γA, θ
i
t = θ
i, and τ it = τ
i.
We proceed under the assumption that the credit constraint is binding in all countries.
Proof of Lemma 1. Starting from (8), dividing both sides by the world effective labor
supply
∑
j A
j
tL
j
m,t, and using the definition of the country weights λ
i, we obtain
n(1 + γA)
∑
i
λi
[
1 +
1− α
α
(
θi +
β−σR1−σt+1
pt + β−σR1−σt+1
τ i
)]
kt+1 = (1− α)kαt
∑
i
λi
p(1− τ it − θi)
p+ β−σR1−σt+1
.
Using the definition of θ and τ in (9) along with the fact that
∑
i λ
i = 1 yields
n(1 + γA)
[
1 +
1− α
α
(
θ +
β−σR1−σt+1
p+ β−σR1−σt+1
τ
)]
kt+1 =
p(1− τ − θ)
p+ β−σR1−σt+1
(1− α)kαt ,
which is the counterpart to (A-7) under integration. The proof of existence, uniqueness, and
convergence to the integrated steady state, as well as the derivation of the implicit definition
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of the equilibrium world interest rate R = R(n, p, γA, θ, τ ;α, β, σ) and its comparative statics
with respect to θ and τ , follow exactly the same steps as in the proof of Lemma A-1. The
elasticity of the average contribution rate τ to aging being equal to ε, Lemma A-2 implies
that a drop in fertility n, or a rise in longevity p, causes a fall in R as long as τ < τ† ≡
τ†(n, p, γA, θ;α, β, σ, ε), where τ† is defined by (A-30).
Remark A-6. Inspection of (A-6) and (11) reveals that the world steady-state interest rate
coincides with the interest rate that would prevail under autarky in a country with credit
constraint and social security parameters θ and τ , respectively. In the remainder of this
appendix, we use the notation R to refer to the world interest rate, and we denote by ηn and
ηp its elasticities with respect to demographic variables, as defined in (A-46). The derivations
in Remark A-5 imply that, if τ < τ† and
n(1 + γA)
p(1− τ − θ)
[
(1 + βp)
(
α
1− α + θ
)
+ τ
]
> 1, (A-53)
the fall in interest rate in response to aging is stronger when the e.i.s. coefficient σ is lower.
Condition (A-53) holds for reasonable parameter values. It also implies that βR > 1 and that
R is decreasing in σ (see Remark A-2).
We now characterize countries’ net foreign asset positions in the integrated steady state.
Lemma A-3. The net foreign asset (NFA) position of country i = 1, ..., N, is given by
NFAit
Y it
= (1− α)
(
n(1 + γA)
R
+
p
p+ β−σR1−σ
)
(θ − θi)
+
1− α
p+ β−σR1−σ
(
p+ β−σR−σn(1 + γA)
)
(τ − τ i). (A-54)
In particular, a country that has tighter credit constraints than the world average (θi < θ),
and/or lower social security than the world average (τ i < τ), tends to export capital.
Proof: The net foreign asset position of country i at the end of period t is defined as
NFAit ≡ W it −Kit+1, (A-55)
where W it denotes the total asset holdings of country i in period t. In view of (A-2), the latter
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is given by
W it = A
i
tL
i
m,t
[
p(1− τ i − θi)
p+ β−σR1−σt+1
(1− α)kαt − n(1 + γA)
1− α
α
(
θi +
β−σR1−σt+1
p+ β−σR1−σt+1
τ i
)
kt+1
]
.
Using this expression along with the fact that Kit+1 = A
i
t+1L
i
m,t+1kt+1 = n(1 + γA)A
i
tL
i
m,tkt+1
and Y it = A
i
tL
i
m,tk
α
t , the net foreign asset position normalized by GDP is
NFAit
Y it
= (1− α)p(1− τ
i − θi)
p+ β−σR1−σt+1
− n(1 + γA)
[
1 +
1− α
α
(
θi +
β−σR1−σt+1
p+ β−σR1−σt+1
τ i
)]
kt+1
kαt
.
In the integrated steady-state equilibrium, Rt+1 = R and kt+1/k
α
t = k
1−α = α/R. Therefore,
the expression for the normalized net foreign asset position becomes
NFAit
Y it
= (1− α)p(1− τ
i − θi)
p+ β−σR1−σ
− n(1 + γA)
R
[
α + (1− α)
(
θi +
β−σR1−σ
p+ β−σR1−σ
τ i
)]
. (A-56)
To obtain (A-54), we note that (11) is equivalent to
(1− α) p(1− τ − θ)
p+ β−σR1−σ
− n(1 + γA)
R
[
α + (1− α)
(
θ +
β−σR1−σ
p+ β−σR1−σ
τ
)]
= 0, (A-57)
i.e., the world interest rate is such that the net asset demand (or NFA position) of a country
with credit constraint and social security parameters θ and τ , respectively, is equal to zero.
Taking the difference between (A-56) and (A-57) gives (A-54).
Remark A-7. With a view to characterizing the impact of global aging on capital flows, it
is useful to study how changes in world demographics affect total asset holdings in any given
country. Considering the normalized country wealth
Ψi ≡ W
i
t
(1− α)Y it
=
p(1− τ i − θi)
p+ β−σR1−σ
− n(1 + γA)
R
(
θi +
β−σR1−σ
p+ β−σR1−σ
τ i
)
, (A-58)
we use (10) to rewrite
Ψi = −n(1 + γA)
R
θi +
p(1− τ i − θi)
p+ β−σR1−σ
− β
−σR1−σ
p+ β−σR1−σ
p%i
R
= −n(1 + γA)
R
θi + ψ(1− τ i − θi)− (1− ψ)p%
i
R
, (A-59)
where
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ψ ≡ p
p+ β−σR1−σ
∈ ]0, 1[ (A-60)
corresponds to the propensity to save of the middle-aged, which is common across countries.
It is straightforward to show that
ψp ≡ ∂ψ
∂p
=
1
p
ψ(1− ψ) > 0 and ψR ≡ ∂ψ
∂R
= −1− σ
R
ψ(1− ψ) ≤ 0, (A-61)
with ψR < 0 when σ < 1. Furthermore, we compute
∂
∂R
(
1− ψ
R
)
= −1− ψ
R2
[1− (1− σ)ψ] < 0. (A-62)
It is useful to also establish the dependence of ψ in σ. To do so, we compute
∂
∂σ
(
β−σ[R(σ)]1−σ
)
=
(
− ln(βR) + ∂R
∂σ
1− σ
R
)
β−σR1−σ.
Under the assumption that (A-53) holds, then βR > 1 and ∂R/∂σ < 0, implying that this
expression is negative (see Remark A-2). In turn, this implies that the propensity to save ψ is
increasing in σ and is therefore bounded above by its value at σ = 1. That is, when condition
(A-53) holds,
ψ ≤ βp
1 + βp
≤ 1
2
, and σ < 1 ⇒ ψ < βp
1 + βp
≤ 1
2
. (A-63)
In order to evaluate the change in Ψi caused by a change in world fertility—taking into
account the adjustments of the world interest rate and of the social security system in country i,
we differentiate (A-59) with respect to n, τ i, %i, and R. This yields
dΨi = −(1 + γA)
R
θi dn− ψ dτ i − (1− ψ) p
R
d%i
+
[
n(1 + γA)
R2
θi + (1− τ i − θi)ψR − p%i ∂
∂R
(
1− ψ
R
)]
dR, (A-64)
where
dτ i = −ε
iτ i
n
dn, d%i =
(1− εi)%i
n
dn, and dR = ηn
R
n
dn. (A-65)
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Combining (A-64) with (A-61), (A-62), (A-65), and (10), we obtain
dΨi
dn
= −(1 + γA)
R
θi +
ψεi
n
τ i − (1− ψ) p
R
(1− εi)(1 + γA)
p
τ i
+
[
n(1 + γA)
R2
θi − 1− σ
R
ψ(1− ψ)(1− τ i − θi)
+
(1− ψ)[1− (1− σ)ψ]
R2
n(1 + γA)τ
i
]
ηn
R
n
. (A-66)
Likewise, we compute the change in Ψi caused by a change in world longevity:
dΨi =
[
(1− τ i − θi)ψp − (1− ψ)%
i
R
+ ψp
p%i
R
]
dp− ψ dτ i − (1− ψ) p
R
d%i
+
[
n(1 + γA)
R2
θi + (1− τ i − θi)ψR − p%i ∂
∂R
(
1− ψ
R
)]
dR, (A-67)
where
dτ i =
τ iεi
p
dp, d%i = −(1− ε
i)%i
p
dp, and dR = −ηpR
p
dp. (A-68)
Using (A-61), (A-62), and (10), we obtain
dΨi
dp
= (1− ψ)
[
ψ
p
(1− τ i − θi)− (1− ψ)n(1 + γA)
pR
τ i
]
− ψε
i
p
τ i +
1− ψ
R
(1− εi)n(1 + γA)
p
τ i
−
[
n(1 + γA)
R2
θi − 1− σ
R
ψ(1− ψ)(1− τ i − θi)
+
(1− ψ)[1− (1− σ)ψ]
R2
n(1 + γA)τ
i
]
ηp
R
p
. (A-69)
A.2 Global Aging and Capital Flows
The proofs of this section build extensively on Remark A-7. In view of the definition (A-55) of
a country’s net foreign asset position, and given the fact that the ratio Kit+1/Y
i
t is equalized
across countries, the difference between the normalized net foreign asset positions of two
countries L and H in the integrated steady state can be expressed as
∆NFA ≡ NFA
L
t
Y Lt
− NFA
H
t
Y Ht
=
WLt
Y Lt
− W
H
t
Y Ht
= (1− α)
(
ΨL −ΨH
)
,
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where Ψi is defined in (A-58). This implies that
∂∆NFA
∂x
= (1− α)
(
∂ΨL
∂x
− ∂Ψ
H
∂x
)
, for x = n, p. (A-70)
The expressions for ∆NFA given in Section 2.2 (in the context of the particular configurations
considered in the discussion) follow immediately from (A-54), combined with (10) in the case
of heterogeneous social security. Throughout this section, we denote by ψ the propensity to
save of the middle-aged, as defined by (A-60).
Proof of Proposition 1. We consider two countries, H and L, such that θL < θH , τH =
τL, and εH = εL. To assess the impact of a change in world fertility on the dispersion in
foreign asset positions, we use (A-70) along with (A-66) and the stated assumptions on the
characteristics of the two countries to obtain
∂∆NFA
∂n
= (1− α)
(
∂ΨL
∂n
− ∂Ψ
H
∂n
)
= −(1− α)
[(
n(1 + γA)
R2
+
1− σ
R
ψ(1− ψ)
)
ηn
R
n
− (1 + γA)
R
]
(θH − θL).
The inequality ∂∆NFA/∂n < 0 holds if and only if
(
n(1 + γA)
R
+ (1− σ)ψ(1− ψ)
)
ηn >
n(1 + γA)
R
,
which is equivalent to the condition
ηn >
1
1 + (1− σ)ψ(1− ψ) R
n(1+γA)
=: η(θ)
n
. (A-71)
Therefore ηn ≥ 1 is a sufficient condition for a fall in world fertility to induce a larger dispersion
in net foreign asset positions. Likewise, we use (A-70) along with (A-69) to obtain
∂∆NFA
∂p
= (1− α)
(
∂ΨL
∂p
− ∂Ψ
H
∂p
)
=
1− α
p
[
ψ(1− ψ) +
(
n(1 + γA)
R
+ (1− σ)ψ(1− ψ)
)
ηp
]
(θH − θL).
Therefore ηp ≥ 0 is a sufficient condition for an increase in world longevity to induce a
larger dispersion in net foreign asset positions. This condition is trivially satisfied under the
realistic assumption that τ < τ† ≡ τ†(n, p, γA, θ;α, β, σ, ε). More generally, one can see that
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∂∆NFA/∂p > 0 if and only if ηp > η
(θ)
p
, where
η(θ)
p
= − ψ(1− ψ)
n(1+γA)
R
+ (1− σ)ψ(1− ψ) < 0. (A-72)
Figure A.4 in Section A.4 of the appendix illustrates the magnitudes of η(θ)
n
, η(θ)
p
, as well as the
difference ηn − η(θ)n and ηp − η(θ)p , and their dependence in σ and τ . For reasonable parameter
values, the conditions for global aging to induce an increase in NFA dispersion are amply
satisfied (even more so for lower values of σ and τ). Lastly, it is worthwhile to note that
∂2∆NFA
∂ηn∂n
< 0 and
∂2∆NFA
∂ηp∂p
> 0,
i.e., the increase in NFA dispersion induced by world aging is stronger when the equilibrium
fall in the world interest rate is larger, as stated in the discussion following the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2. We now consider two countries, H and L, such that θH = θL,
τL < τH , and εH = εL = ε. Using (A-70) along with (A-66) and the stated assumptions on
the characteristics of the two countries, we obtain
∂∆NFA
∂n
= (1− α)
(
∂ΨL
∂n
− ∂Ψ
H
∂n
)
= −(1− α)
[
ψε
n
− (1− ψ)(1− ε)(1 + γA)
R
+ (1− ψ)
(
(1− σ)ψ
n
+
(1 + γA)[1− (1− σ)ψ]
R
)
ηn
]
(τH − τL).
In this configuration, the inequality ∂∆NFA/∂n < 0 holds if and only if
ψε
n
− (1− ψ)(1− ε)(1 + γA)
R
+ (1− ψ)
(
(1− σ)ψ
n
+
(1 + γA)[1− (1− σ)ψ]
R
)
ηn > 0,
which is equivalent to
(
(1− σ)ψ + n(1 + γA)[1− (1− σ)ψ]
R
)
ηn >
n(1 + γA)
R
− ε
(
n(1 + γA)
R
+
ψ
1− ψ
)
. (A-73)
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Likewise, we use (A-70) along with (A-69) to obtain
∂∆NFA
∂p
= (1− α)
(
∂ΨL
∂p
− ∂Ψ
H
∂p
)
=
(1− α)(1− ψ)
p
[
ψ + (1− ψ)n(1 + γA)
R
+
ψε
1− ψ −
(1− ε)n(1 + γA)
R
+
(
(1− σ)ψ + n(1 + γA)[1− (1− σ)ψ]
R
)
ηp
]
(τH − τL).
Hence, the inequality ∂∆NFA/∂p > 0 holds if and only if
ψ + (1− ψ)n(1 + γA)
R
+
ψε
1− ψ +
(
(1− σ)ψ + n(1 + γA)[1− (1− σ)ψ]
R
)
ηp
>
(1− ε)n(1 + γA)
R
,
which is equivalent to
(
(1− σ)ψ + n(1 + γA)[1− (1− σ)ψ]
R
)
ηp
> ψ
(
n(1 + γA)
R
− 1
)
− ε
(
n(1 + γA)
R
+
ψ
1− ψ
)
. (A-74)
Conditions (A-73) and (A-74) can be rewritten as
ηn >
1− ε
(
1 + ψ
1−ψ
R
n(1+γA)
)
[1− (1− σ)ψ] + (1− σ)ψ R
n(1+γA)
=: η(τ)
n
(A-75)
and
ηp >
ψ
(
1− R
n(1+γA)
)
− ε
(
1 + ψ
1−ψ
R
n(1+γA)
)
[1− (1− σ)ψ] + (1− σ)ψ R
n(1+γA)
=: η(τ)
p
, (A-76)
respectively. It is worthwhile to note that η(τ)
n
> η(τ)
p
, i.e., the condition on ηn is tighter than
the one on ηp, reflecting the fact that an increase in longevity directly contributes to an in-
crease in the dispersion of NFA positions—whereas a drop in fertility only affects capital flows
indirectly through the interest rate and social security channels. Figure A.5 in Section A.4
of the appendix illustrates the magnitudes of η(τ)
n
, η(τ)
p
, as well as the difference ηn − η(τ)n and
ηp − η(τ)p , and their dependence in σ and τ .
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Sufficient Conditions on Parameter Values. From (A-75), we see that η(τ)
n
≤ 0 if
ε ≥ 1
1 + ψ
1−ψ
R
n(1+γA)
.
Moreover, if condition (A-53) holds, then
ψR
1− ψ =
pR
β−σR1−σ
= p(βR)σ > p. (A-77)
Therefore, if τ < τ† and (A-53) holds, a sufficient condition for a drop in n to generate uphill
capital flows is
ε ≥
(
1 +
p
n(1 + γA)
)−1
.
Likewise, from (A-76), we see that η(τ)
p
≤ 0 if
(
1 +
ψ
1− ψ
R
n(1 + γA)
)
ε ≥ ψ
(
1− R
n(1 + γA)
)
.
Under condition (A-53), using (A-77) and R > 1/β, this yields the sufficient condition
(
1 +
p
n(1 + γA)
)
ε ≥ 1
2
(
1− 1
βn(1 + γA)
)
,
or equivalently
ε ≥ 1
2
× βn(1 + γA)− 1
βn(1 + γA) + βp
.
Therefore, if τ < τ† and (A-53) holds, then given any ε ≥ 0, a sufficient condition for a rise
in p to generate uphill capital flows is βn(1 + γA) ≤ 1. This condition is satisfied, e.g., for
β = 0.9625, 1 + γA = (1 + 1%)
25 and n ≤ 2.16, which maps into an actual fertility rate of 4.32.
A.3 Country-Specific Aging
We proceed under the assumptions of Section 2.3, i.e., country i is a small open economy
(SOE). The world interest rate Rt+1 between periods t and t + 1, as well as the capital-
effective-labor ratios kt and kt+1 in these periods, are taken as given. To start with, we derive
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the expression for country i’s NFA position in period t, normalized by GDP. Using (A-2) and
(A-55) along with (2), we find that
NFAit
Y it
≡ W
i
t −Kit+1
Y it
= (1− α)ψit(1− τ it − θit−1)
− n
i
t−1(1 + γ
i
A,t+1)
Rt+1
(
α + (1− α)θit
)(kt+1
kt
)α
− (1− α)(1− ψit)pit%it+1Rt+1 , (A-78)
where, consistent with the notation introduced in (A-60), we define
ψit ≡
pit
pit + β
−σR1−σt+1
.
Proof of Proposition 3. By inspection of (A-78), we see that the net foreign asset position of
country i in period t is affected by past fertility (nit−1) and by the current survival probability
(pit), but not by other aspects of the country’s demographic evolutions. We denote by ε
i
t+1
the elasticity of the contribution rate to the old-dependency ratio in period t + 1, assuming
that its adjustment is independent of whether aging is caused by a drop in fertility or a rise
in longevity. Specifically, we define
− ∂τ
i
t+1/τ
i
t+1
∂nit−1/n
i
t−1
=
∂τ it+1/τ
i
t+1
∂pit/p
i
t
= εit+1,
implying that
− ∂%
i
t+1/%
i
t+1
∂nit−1/n
i
t−1
=
∂%it+1/%
i
t+1
∂pit/p
i
t
= −(1− εit+1).
In view of (A-78), the change in country i’s NFA position in period t caused by a change in
nit−1 is given by
d
(
NFAit
Y it
)
= −
(
α + (1− α)θit
)1 + γiA,t+1
Rt+1
(
kt+1
kt
)α
dnit−1 − (1− α)
(
1− ψit
) pit
Rt+1
d%it+1,
where d%it+1 =
(
(1− εit+1)%it+1/nit−1
)
dnit−1. We thus have
∂
∂nit−1
(
NFAit
Y it
)
= −
(
α + (1− α)θit
)1 + γiA,t+1
Rt+1
(
kt+1
kt
)α
− (1− α)(1− εit+1)(1− ψit) pitRt+1 %
i
t+1
nit−1
.
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A sufficient condition for this expression to be negative is that εit+1 ≤ 1. More generally,
∂2
∂εit+1∂n
i
t−1
(
NFAit
Y it
)
> 0,
and it is immediate to see that there exists a unique threshold ε˜n > 1 such that a drop in
fertility in period t− 1 causes an increase in NFA/GDP in period t if and only if εit+1 < ε˜n.
The change in the country’s NFA position caused by a change in pit is given by
d
(
NFAit
Y it
)
= (1− α)(1− τ it − θit−1)∂ψit∂pit dpit − 1− αRt+1 ∂∂pit
((
1− ψit
)
pit%
i
t+1
)
dpit.
Using the fact that
∂ψit
∂pit
=
ψit(1− ψit)
pit
and observing that
∂
∂pit
((
1− ψit
)
pit%
i
t+1
)
= −pit%it+1
∂ψit
∂pit
+
(
1− ψit
)(
%it+1 + p
i
t
∂%it+1
∂pit
)
=
(
1− ψit
)(− ψit + 1− (1− εit+1))%it+1 = (1− ψit)(εit+1 − ψit)%it+1,
where the second equality uses ∂%it+1/∂p
i
t = −(1− εit+1)%it+1/pit, we obtain
∂
∂pit
(
NFAit
Y it
)
= (1− α)(1− ψit)
((
1− τ it − θit−1
)ψit
pit
+
(
ψit − εit+1
)
%it+1
Rt+1
)
.
It is immediate to see that
∂2
∂εit+1∂p
i
t
(
NFAit
Y it
)
< 0,
and that ∂(NFAit/Y
i
t )/∂p
i
t > 0 if and only if
εit+1 <
(
1 +
(
1− τ it − θit−1
)
Rt+1
pit%
i
t+1
)
ψit =: ε˜p. (A-79)
In order to gauge how restrictive this condition is, consider the case where σ = 1 and the rest
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of the world is in an integrated steady state as characterized in Lemma 1. Then
ψit =
βpit
1 + βpit
and Rt+1 =
n(1 + γA)
βp(1− τ − θ)
[
(1 + βp)
(
α
1− α + θ
)
+ τ
]
for all t.
Furthermore, consider the impact on NFA of a rise in longevity dpit > 0 in country i, assuming
that this country is similar to the average world economy in every relevant dimension, that
is, nit−1 = n, γ
i
A,t+1 = γA, θ
i
t−1 = θ, and τ
i
t = τ . Evaluating the right-hand side of (A-79) at
the point pit = p, one can see that, in this special case,
∂
∂pit
(
NFAit
Y it
)
> 0 ⇔ εit+1 < 1 +
α
1−α + θ
τ
,
which for reasonable values of α, θ and τ gives an upper threshold ε˜p largely above one.
Remark A-8. It is worthwhile to note the natural similarity between the condition εit+1 < ε˜n
(resp. εit+1 < ε˜p) needed for a decrease in n
i
t−1 (resp. an increase in p
i
t) to cause an increase in
NFA and the condition ε < εˆn (resp. ε < εˆp) needed for a drop in n (resp. rise in p) to induce
a fall in the steady-state autarky interest rate (see (A-29) in the proof of Lemma A-2).
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A.4 Figures
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Figure A.1: Threshold τ† and Implied Replacement Rate.
Notes: This figure displays level curves for the threshold τ† defined by (A-30) and for the implied replacement
rate %, for different values of the e.i.s. coefficient (σ) and of the elasticity (ε) of the steady-state contribution
rate to aging. The implied replacement rate is obtained from (A-5) for τ = τ†. The left panel is for n = 1,
p = 0.85, and θ = 15%. The right panel is for n = 2, p = 0.7, and θ = 2.5%. Other parameter values are
α = 0.3, β = 0.96 (annual), and γA = 1% (annual). A period lasts for 25 years.
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Figure A.2: Elasticity of the Interest Rate to Fertility.
Notes: This figure displays level curves for the elasticity ηn of the steady-state interest rate with respect to
the fertility rate n, given by (A-47), for different values of the e.i.s. coefficient σ and of the contribution rate τ .
The left panel is for n = 1, p = 0.85, and θ = 15%. The right panel is for n = 2, p = 0.7, and θ = 2.5%. Other
parameter values are α = 0.3, β = 0.96 (annual), γA = 1% (annual), and ε = 0.8. A period lasts for 25 years.
0.20.40.60.81
1.5
2
2.5
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
eis coefficient ( )
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
co
n
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
ra
te
 (
)
0.20.40.60.81
1.5
2
2.5
3
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
eis coefficient ( )
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
co
n
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
ra
te
 (
)
Figure A.3: Elasticity of the Interest Rate to Longevity.
Notes: This figure displays level curves for the elasticity ηp of the steady-state interest rate with respect to
the survival probability p, given by (A-48), for different values of the e.i.s. coefficient σ and of the contribution
rate τ . Parameter values for both left and right panels are set as in Figure A.2.
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Figure A.4: Thresholds for ηn and ηp: Heterogeneity in Credit Constraints.
Notes: This figure displays level curves for the thresholds η(θ)
n
and η(θ)
p
defined in (A-71) and (A-72), as well
as for the differences ηn − η(θ)n and ηp − η(θ)p , as a function of the e.i.s. coefficient σ and of the world average
contribution rate τ . Parameter values are α = 0.3, β = 0.96 (annual), and γA = 1% (annual), n = 1.25,
p = 0.8, θ = 10%, and ε = 0.8. A period lasts for 25 years.
78
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
eis coefficient ( )
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
1.41.61.8
22.5
3
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
eis coefficient ( )
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
-2.3-2.1-1.9-1.7
-1.5
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
eis coefficient ( )
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
2.6
2.7
2.7
2.8
2.82.9
33.5
4
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
eis coefficient ( )
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Figure A.5: Thresholds for ηn and ηp: Heterogeneity in Social Security.
Notes: This figure displays level curves for the thresholds η(τ)
n
and η(τ)
p
defined in (A-75) and (A-76), as well
as for the differences ηn − η(τ)n and ηp − η(τ)p , as a function of the e.i.s. coefficient σ and of the world average
contribution rate τ . Parameter values are α = 0.3, β = 0.96 (annual), and γA = 1% (annual), n = 1.25,
p = 0.8, θ = 10%, and ε = 0.8. A period lasts for 25 years.
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B Solution Method for the Quantitative Model
This appendix provides a detailed description of the solution method for the quantitative
model considered in Sections 3 and 4.
B.1 Individual Optimization
In the environment described in Section 3.1, an agent born in period t and country i faces
a sequence of gross rates of return {Rit+j+1}J¯−1j=0 , labor income {wij,t+j}J¯j=0, social security
taxes {τ it+j}J¯j=0, pension benefits {piij,t+j}J¯j=0, and bequest transfers {qij,t+j}J¯−1j=0 . The agent’s
problem under perfect foresight consists in choosing a path of consumption and asset holdings
to maximize expected lifetime utility (15) subject to flow budget constraints (16) and credit
constraints (17).
B.2 Autarky Steady State
Consider a steady state in country i where eij,t = e
i
j, conditional survival probabilities remain
constant over time (pij,t = p
i
j) and L
i
0,t+1 = (1 + γ
i
L)L
i
0,t, so that the total population grows at
constant rate γiL, productivity grows at constant rate γ
i
A, and %
i
t = %
i in every period. The
steady-state contribution rate τ i must satisfy
τ i
J¯∑
j=0
Lij,te
i
jw
i
t = %
ieiJ
J¯∑
j=J+1
Lij,tw
i
t+J−j,
which implies
τ i = %ieiJ
J¯∑
j=J+1
(
Lij,t∑J¯
`=0 e
i
`L
i
`,t
)
wit+J−j
wit
= %ieiJ
J¯∑
j=J+1
(
(1 + γiL)
−j∏j−1
m=0 p
i
m∑J¯
`=0 e
i
`(1 + γ
i
L)
−`∏`−1
m=0 p
i
m
)
(1 + γiA)
J−j. (B-1)
Let ki = Kit/A
i
tLˆ
i
t denote the autarky steady-state level of capital-efficient-labor ratio in
country i, where Lˆit ≡
∑J¯
j=0 e
i
j,tL
i
j,t. The market clearing condition at the end of period t is
Kit+1 = A
i
t+1Lˆ
i
t+1k
i =
J¯−1∑
j=0
Lij,ta
i
j,t. (B-2)
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In order to determine the steady state equilibrium, we need to characterize net asset holdings
aij,t for a given value of k
i. It is useful to observe that, in the steady state, aij,t should grow
over time at rate γiA, while the total amount of unintentional bequests Q
i
t grows at rate
γiY = (1 + γ
i
A)(1 + γ
i
L)− 1. Thus, there exists {a˜ij}J¯−1j=0 and Q˜i such that
aij,t = a˜
i
jw
i
t−j, for all j, t (B-3)
Qit = Q˜
iL0,tw
i
t, for all t. (B-4)
Using this observation, we solve for the steady-state autarky equilibrium in two steps.
Step 1: As a preliminary step, we analyze the joint determination of the values of {a˜ij}J¯−1j=0
and Q˜i for a candidate steady-state interest rate Ri = 1 − δ + α(ki)α−1. First, we show how
to solve for {a˜ij} taking Q˜i as given. Starting from (14) and using (B-4), we note that in the
steady state, the level of bequests received at the end of period t by an agent of age j ∈ B
can be expressed as
qij,t =
Qit∑
m∈B p
i
mL
i
m,t
= Q˜i
Li0,t∑
m∈B p
i
mL
i
m,t
wit
= Q˜i
(∑
m∈B
pim
∏m−1
`=0 p
i
`
(1 + γiL)
m
)−1
wit
= Q˜i
(∑
m∈B
pim
∏m−1
`=0 p
i
`
(1 + γiL)
m
)−1
(1 + γiA)
jwit−j =: q˜
i
jw
i
t−j. (B-5)
Moreover, the labor income received in period t by a worker of age j is
wij,t = e
i
jw
i
t = e
i
j(1 + γ
i
A)
jwit−j =: w˜
i
jw
i
t−j,
and the amount of pensions received in period t by an agent of age j > J is
piij,t = %
iwiJ,t+J−j = %
ieiJw
i
t+J−j = %
ieiJ(1 + γ
i
A)
Jwit−j =: p˜i
i
jw
i
t−j.
Now, consider the individual optimization problem of an agent born in period t − j. This
agent faces a sequence of labor income wij,t = w˜
i
jw
i
t−j, constant tax rate τ
i, pension transfers
piij,t = p˜i
i
jw
i
t−j and wealth transfers q
i
j,t = q˜
i
jw
i
t−j. Since in our environment the solution to
the individual optimization problem is homogeneous of degree one in the level of wages and
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transfers, the optimal path of asset holdings {aij,t} for this agent satisfies aij,t = a˜ijwit−j, where
{a˜ij} denotes the optimal path of asset holdings in the normalized optimization problem of
an individual who faces a sequence of wages {w˜ij}, tax rate τ i, and transfers {p˜iij} and {q˜ij}.
Note that since q˜ij = q˜
i
j(Q˜
i) as per (B-5), the normalized amount of unintentional bequests Q˜i
affects wealth accumulation, that is {a˜ij} = {a˜ij(Q˜i)}.
Conversely individual wealth accumulation, captured by {a˜ij}, affects the normalized amount
of unintentional bequests Q˜i. Indeed, using the expression for Qit in (13) along with (B-3) and
(B-4), we have in the steady state
Q˜iLi0,tw
i
t =
J¯−1∑
j=0
(1− pij)Lij,ta˜ijwit−j
⇒ Q˜i =
J¯−1∑
j=0
(1− pij)
Lij,t
Li0,t
wit−j
wit
a˜ij
⇒ Q˜i =
J¯−1∑
j=0
(1− pij)
∏j−1
`=0 p
i
`
[(1 + γiL)(1 + γ
i
A)]
j
a˜ij. (B-6)
The value of Q˜i in the autarky steady state is obtained as a fixed point by solving (B-6) with
a˜ij = a˜
i
j(Q˜
i). In turn, this immediately pins down normalized asset holdings {a˜ij}.
Step 2: Using the fact that aij,t = a˜
i
jw
i
t+1/(1 + γ
i
A)
j+1 and Lij,t =
(∏j−1
`=0 p
i
`
)
Li0,t+1/(1 + γ
i
L)
j+1,
the market clearing condition (B-2) can be rewritten as
{
J¯∑
j=0
eij
∏j−1
`=0 p
i
`
(1 + γiL)
j
}
(ki)1−α = (1− α)
J¯−1∑
j=0
∏j−1
`=0 p
i
`
[(1 + γiL)(1 + γ
i
A)]
j+1
a˜ij(k
i), (B-7)
where the notation a˜ij(k
i) captures the fact that (normalized) net asset positions depend on
the steady-state rate of return, as previously described. Equation (B-7) implicitly defines the
level of the capital-effective-labor ratio in the autarky steady state.
B.3 Integrated Steady State
Consider an integrated steady state where (1 +γiA)(1 +γ
i
L) = 1 +γY in all countries, although
countries may be heterogeneous in other respects. Social security systems are balanced in
all countries; hence τ i must satisfy (B-1) for all i, taking %i as given. Capital-effective-labor
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ratios are equalized across countries,
Kit
AitLˆ
i
t
= k.
The integrated steady state is determined along the same logic as for the autarky steady state.
Step 1: Taking the steady-state value of the gross rate of return R as given, we consider the
(normalized) optimization problem of an individual in country i with labor income sequence
{w˜ij}J¯j=0 with w˜ij = eij(1+γiA)j and constant tax rate τ i, pension transfers p˜iij = %ieiJ(1+γiA)J−1
for J < j ≤ J¯ , and wealth transfers {q˜ij}j∈B satisfying (B-5) for some Q˜i. Let {a˜ij(Q˜i)}J¯j=0
denote the optimal path of wealth. For each country i, the normalized amount of unintentional
bequest Q˜i ≡ Q˜i(R) is obtained as a fixed point, namely, as the solution to
Q˜i =
J¯−1∑
j=0
(1− pij)
∏j−1
`=0 p
i
`
(1 + γY )j
a˜ij(Q˜
i).
Stationarity and homogeneity imply that, if the world steady-state interest rate is R, the
wealth at age j of an agent born in period t in country i is aij,t+j = a˜
i
jw
i
t, where a˜
i
j = a˜
i
j[Q˜
i(R)].
In the reminder of this subsection, we use the notation a˜ij(k) to denote the normalized asset
holdings of an individual of age j in country i when the steady-steady capital-effective-labor
ratio is k, which is identical to a˜ij[Q˜
i(R)] with R = 1− δ + αkα−1.
Step 2: The market clearing condition at the end of period t is
∑
i
Kit+1 ≡ k
∑
i
Ait+1Lˆ
i
t+1 =
∑
i
J¯−1∑
j=0
Lij,ta
i
j,t, (B-8)
which is equivalent to
{∑
i
Ait+1L
i
0,t+1
J∑
j=0
eij
∏j−1
`=0 p
i
`
(1 + γiL)
j
}
k1−α = (1− α)
∑
i
Ait+1L
i
0,t+1
J¯−1∑
j=0
∏j−1
`=0 p
i
`
(1 + γY )j+1
a˜ij(k).
Let ηi ≡∑Jj=0 eij(∏j−1`=0 pi`)(1+γiL)j , and introduce country weights
λi ≡ η
iAit+1L
i
0,t+1∑
n η
nAnt+1L
n
0,t+1
.
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The market clearing condition can be rewritten
k1−α = (1− α)
∑
i
λi
ηi
J¯−1∑
j=0
∏j−1
`=0 p
i
`
(1 + γY )j+1
a˜ij(k)
= (1− α)
J¯−1∑
j=0
1
(1 + γY )j+1
∑
i
λi
ηi
(
j−1∏
`=0
pi`
)
a˜ij(k).
Special case: when ηi = η in every country, the market clearing condition simplifies to
k1−α =
1− α
η
J¯−1∑
j=0
1
(1 + γY )j+1
[∑
i
λi
(
j−1∏
`=0
pi`
)
a˜ij(k)
]
,
where λi corresponds to the constant share of country i in world effective labor.
B.4 Dynamics
The law of motion for kt ≡ (kit)Ni=1 in the transition depends on whether countries are finan-
cially integrated or in financial autarky. In both cases, it takes the form of a forward-backward
difference equation (FBDE).
Under autarky, the market clearing condition in period t and country i is
Ait+1Lˆ
i
t+1k
i
t+1 =
J¯−1∑
j=0
Lij,ta
i
j,t.
The generations who matter in period t are those born in periods t− J¯ + 1 to t. Thus market
clearing in period t pins down kit+1 given the following inputs:
• lagged values KiL,t+1 ≡ {kis}ts=t−J¯+1 and future values KiF,t+1 ≡ {kis}t+J¯s=t+2,
• past, current, and future productivity {Ais}t+J¯s=t−J¯+1,
• past, current, and future age-income profiles, i.e., {eij,s+j}J¯j=0 for s = t− J¯ + 1, ..., t,
• replacement rates {%is}t+J¯s=t−J¯+J+2,
• contribution rates T it+1 ≡ {τ is}t+J¯s=t−J¯+1,
• demographics, summarized by {Li0,s}ts=t−J¯+1 and {pij,s+j}J¯−1j=0 for s = t− J¯ + 1, ..., t,
• past, current, and future amounts of unintentional bequests Qit+1 ≡ {Qiτ}t+J¯−1τ=t−J¯+1.
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If instead countries are financially integrated in period t, then rates of return are equalized
Rit+1 = Rt+1, for all i,
and so are the capital-effective-labor ratios
kit+1 ≡ Kit+1/(Ait+1Lˆit+1) = kt+1, for all i.
The market clearing condition in period t is
∑
i
Kit+1 = kt+1
∑
i
Ait+1Lˆ
i
t+1 =
∑
i
J¯−1∑
j=0
Lij,ta
i
j,t.
Thus market clearing in period t pins down kt+1 given
• lagged and future values, KL,t+1 ≡ (KiL,t+1)Ni=1 and KF,t+1 ≡ (KiF,t+1)Ni=1,
• productivity {Ais}t+J¯s=t−J¯+1 for i = 1, ..., N ,
• age-income profiles, i.e., {eij,s+j}J¯j=0 for s = t− J¯ + 1, ..., t and i = 1, ..., N ,
• replacement rates {%is}t+J¯s=t−J¯+J+2 for i = 1, ..., N ,
• contribution rates T t+1 ≡ (T it+1)Ni=1,
• demographics, summarized by {Li0,s}ts=t−J¯+1 and {pij,s+j}J¯−1j=0 for s = t− J¯ + 1, ..., t, and
i = 1, ..., N ,
• total amounts of unintentional bequests Qt+1 ≡ (Qit+1)Ni=1.
B.5 Shooting Algorithm
Consider an experiment where countries start in financial autarky and integrate in period X
(say, X = 0). Hence for t ≥ X + 1, kit = kt, for all i. Around the integration period, we feed
the model with ‘shocks’ to demographics, credit constraints, and social security. We allow for
shocks over the window [X − T, X + T]. All shocks are perfectly anticipated. The sequence
of replacement rates {%it} is taken as given. Adjustments to the contribution rates {τ it} are
obtained as part of the equilibrium construction.
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In order to determine how the global economy responds to financial integration and other
shocks, we use the following algorithm.
1. We assume that each country starts at its autarky steady state, and that the economy
does not react to future shocks before period X−T , for T > T large. That is, kit = ki∗ for
t ≤ X−T−1. The initial steady state for country i, including asset holding positions by
age groups, is determined for given parameters {eij}J¯j=0, (γiA, γiL), {pij}J¯−1j=0 , and (θi, %i) as
described in Section B.2. From the initial steady state, we obtain unintentional bequests
Qit for t ≤ X − T − 1. In particular,
QiX−T−1 = (1− α)AiX−T−1(ki∗)αLi0,X−T−1Q˜i[ki∗],
where Q˜i[ki∗] is obtained as a fixed point as explained in Step 1 of Section B.2.
2. We assume that the world economy has converged to its final integrated steady state
k∗ in period X + T + 1. That is, kt = k∗ for t ≥ X + T + 1. The final steady state
is determined, along with other parameters, by countries’ relative weights {λi}Ni=1, as
described in Section B.3. Unintentional bequests in period X + T + 1 are
QiX+T+1 = (1− α)AiX+T+1(k∗)αLi0,X+T+1Q˜i[k∗],
where Q˜i[k∗] is obtained as a fixed point as explained in Step 1 of Section B.3.
3. The transition path of the economy between periods X − T and X + T is obtained
iteratively as follows.
(a) We start with a guess (indexed by 0) for the paths of capital-effective-labor ratios
{k(0)t }X+Tt=X−T , contribution rates {τ (0)t }X+Tt=X−T , and unintentional bequests {Q(0)t }X+Tt=X−T .
In particular, given {ki(0)t } and {%it}, the initial path {τ i(0)t } follows from the bal-
anced budget condition, Eq. (12).
(b) For n ≥ 0, given the paths {k(n)t }X+Tt=X−T , {τ (n)t }X+Tt=X−T , and {Q(n)t }X+Tt=X−T , the up-
dated paths {k(n+1)t }X+Tt=X−T , {τ (n+1)t }X+Tt=X−T , and {Q(n+1)t }X+Tt=X−T are obtained in
three steps as follows.
i. First, we solve for the updated path {k(n+1)t }X+Tt=X−T , given contribution rates
{τ (n)t }X+Tt=X−T and transfers {Q(n)t }X+Tt=X−T . More precisely:
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– We obtain {k(n+1)t }Xt=X−T by iterating on the autarkic forward-backward
difference equation (FBDE) in each country (see Section B.4). Specifically,
for each country i, and for t = X − T, . . . , X, we compute ki(n+1)t as the
solution to the autarkic FBDE, given K
i(n)
L,t , K
i(n)
F,t , T
i(n)
t , and Qi(n)t .
– We determine the common path {k(n+1)t }X+Tt=X+1 by iterating on the inte-
grated FBDE. Specifically, for t = X + 1, . . . , X +T , we compute k
(n+1)
t as
the solution to the integrated FBDE given K
(n)
L,t , K
(n)
F,t , T
(n)
t , and Q(n)t .
ii. Given {k(n+1)t }X+Tt=X−T , the updated sequence of contribution rates {τ (n+1)t }X+Tt=X−T
is obtained from the balanced budget condition, Eq. (12).
iii. Finally, we obtain the updated path of aggregate bequests {Q(n+1)t }X+Tt=X−T as
per Eq. (13), where the asset holdings of all generations in each period are
computed given {k(n+1)t }X+Tt=X−T , {τ (n+1)t }X+Tt=X−T , and {Q(n)t }X+Tt=X−T .
(c) We iterate on n until convergence, based on the distance between two consecutive
paths {k(n)t }X+Tt=X−T and {k(n+1)t }X+Tt=X−T .
4. We verify that T is large enough for the distances |ki(∞)X−T − ki∗| and |k(∞)X+T − k∗| to fall
below some convergence threshold.
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C Data and Quantitative Calibration
This appendix provides details on the data and the calibration of the quantitative model.
C.1 Data Sources
Demographics. United Nations World Population Prospects. Data on population composi-
tion 1950-2015 (5-year periods) and medium scenario for projections over 2020-2100. Survival
probabilities from life tables (Life table survivors at exact age, for both sexes), 1950-2100
(5-year periods), medium variant for projections.
GDP, Labor Income, Consumer Price Index. World Development Indicators (World
Bank) for GDP, income per capita, and CPI data. Wage data from OECD, proxy using GDP
per worker from Penn World Tables for non-OECD countries. American Community Survey
for labor income by age groups in the U.S. from IPUMS, provided by Ruggles et al. (2010).
Current Account. World Development Indicators, completed with OECD and Asian De-
velopment Bank data. Annual data on current account over GDP are averaged over 5-year
periods (symmetric around the base year, e.g., 1988-1992 for 1990).
Net Exports of Oil and Gas. COMTRADE data (1990-2016). Exports and imports of
oil and gas by country in USD: commodity code 2709 (Petroleum oils and oils obtained from
bituminous minerals, crude) and commodity code 2711 (Petroleum gases and other gaseous
hydrocarbons). Net exports (in current USD) are normalized by GDP (in current USD) using
GDP data from the World Development Indicators.
Conflicts. Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). Data includes dates, duration, location,
involved parties, and estimates for battle-related deaths (in a given year) by conflicts for the
period 1989-2016.
Household Debt and U.S. Savings. Bank of International Settlements (1985-2016), com-
pleted when necessary with OECD and Eurostat data. Predictors of household debt over
GDP are from the Global Financial Inclusion Database (World Bank, 2011) and Financial
Development and Structure Dataset (World Bank, 2013; Cihak et al. (2012)). U.S. savings
from World Development Indicators.
Social Security. Replacement rates computed by the authors based on information col-
lected from the U.S. Social Security Administration (Social Security Programs Throughout
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the World, in collaboration with the International Social Security Association). Coverage from
the International Labour Organization (Social Security Department), latest available year.
Real Interest Rate. Monthly data on 5-year Treasury constant maturity nominal rate
(annualized, not seasonally adjusted), averaged over 5-year periods. Inflation rate over same
5-year periods computed from the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (seasonally
adjusted). Nominal rate and price index are from the Federal Reserve Economic Data.
Capital Account Openness. Chinn-Ito Index (kaopenit), de jure measure of financial open-
ness (2015 version of the dataset). See Chinn and Ito (2008) for details on index construction.
C.2 Country Sample and Regions
The 193 countries for which demographic data are available from the United Nations World
Population Prospects are listed below. The grouping of countries into regions corresponds to
the one used in the figures (e.g., Figures 1 and 3.3). Advanced countries (†) refer to OECD
members considered as High-Income by the World Bank (World Development Indicators).
Countries appearing in bold are those that are included in the quantitative evaluation of the
model in Section 3. Our sample selection procedure is detailed below.
Anglo-Saxon Countries: Australia†, Canada†, Channel Islands, Iceland†, Ireland†, New
Zealand†, United Kingdom†, United States†.
Old Europe and Japan: Austria†, Belgium†, Cyprus, Denmark†, Finland†, France†,
Germany†, Greece†, Italy†, Japan†, Luxembourg†, Malta, Netherlands†, Norway†, Portugal†,
Spain†, Sweden†, Switzerland†.
Central/Eastern Europe: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech Republic†, Estonia†, Hungary†, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mon-
tenegro, Poland†, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic†, Slovenia†,
Ukraine.
Latin America and the Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Bar-
bados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Curacao, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Hon-
duras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Saint Lucia,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, St. Kitts and Nevis,
United States Virgin Islands, Uruguay, Venezuela.
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South-East Asia: Brunei, Cambodia, China, Dem. People’s Republic of Korea, Hong
Kong, Indonesia, Korea (Republic of)†, Lao PDR, Macao SAR, Myanmar, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam.
South and Central Asia: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Georgia,
India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.
Middle East and North Africa: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt Arab Rep., Iran Islamic Rep., Iraq,
Israel†, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lybia, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab
Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Congo Dem. Rep., Cote d’Ivoire,
Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sey-
chelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda,
United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Pacific Islands: Fiji, Guam, Kiribati, Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Is-
lands, Tonga, Vanuatu.
Sample Selection for the Quantitative Evaluation. The initial sample that we consider
comprises the 100 most populated economies in 1990, accounting for 97% of world population.
Countries are removed from the sample when at least one of the following circumstances is
met: (i) missing necessary data inputs for the simulations, (ii) countries affected by severe
conflicts on their soil, (iii) major oil and gas producers.
Missing data inputs. To target country sizes, we use data on GDP in 2000. The data is
missing for Afghanistan, Dem. People’s Republic of Korea, Iraq, Somalia, and South Sudan.
Data on the level of development of credit markets are necessary to predict household debt
over GDP for countries for which it is not observed (see Section C.4). The data is missing for
Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Mozambique, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela.
Lastly, data on current accounts are too sparse for Serbia, covering only 8 years (on top of
some of the previously cited countries). Quite a few of the countries that are dropped due
to missing data would also be excluded on the ground that they suffered deadly conflicts on
their soil over the period of interest (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq).
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Conflicts. Using data on the location of conflicts and the corresponding casualties over the
period 1989-2016, we compute the total number of deaths in a given conflict by summing the
battle-related deaths over the duration of the conflict (best estimates from UCDP). Then,
we compute a measure of the intensity of the conflict (‘deaths per capita’), dividing the
total number of casualties by the population of the countries involved in the conflict. This
measure of conflict intensity is attributed to the countries where the conflict is located. Lastly,
for a country involved in several conflicts on its soil, deaths per capita are added by country.
Countries are removed from our sample when the country-specific measure of deaths per capita
exceeds 1/1000 over the period of the conflict. On top of countries dropped due to missing
data, the following countries are excluded: Angola, Burundi, Chad, El Salvador, Rwanda, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan.
Oil and gas exporters. Using COMTRADE data over 1990-2016, we compute, for a given
country, net exports of oil and gas normalized by its GDP in a given year. Because the time
coverage varies across countries, we compute for each country the average of net exports over
GDP over the years for which this ratio is observed. When the average exceeds 15% of GDP,
the country is excluded from the sample. On top of countries dropped due to missing data or
deadly conflicts (e.g., Angola, Iraq), the following additional countries are excluded: Algeria,
Azerbaijan, Iran Islamic Rep., Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Russia, with
net exports of oil and gas accounting for 11% of its GDP, remains part of the sample.
The 70 countries included in our final sample account for 85% of world population in 1990.
C.3 Demographics
Worldwide Demographic Evolutions. Figure 1 in the Introduction describes worldwide
demographic evolutions since 1950. Figure C.1 provides further insight on these evolutions,
showing the distribution of fertility rates and life expectancy across countries in 1960 and 2015
(for the sample of 193 countries covered in the United Nations World Population Prospects). In
1960, the world is essentially bi-modal—with advanced economies characterized by low fertility
rates and high life expectancy, versus emerging countries characterized by higher fertility and
lower life expectancy. By 2015, the masses of the distributions have moved towards lower
fertility and higher longevity, and demographic patterns have become more homogeneous
across the globe. A large majority of countries exhibit low fertility rates comparable to those
of advanced economies. The two groups of countries also became more similar in terms of life
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Figure C.1: Cross-Country Distributions of Fertility Rates and Life Expectancy.
Notes: The histograms in panels (a) and (c) represent the cross-country distribution of fertility rates adjusted
for infant mortality. The histograms in panels (b) and (d) represent the cross-country distribution of life
expectancy at birth. See Appendices C.1–C.2 for data sources and country sample.
expectancy. Very few countries have life expectancy below 60 in 2015.
Demographic Calibration: Model vs Data. Our procedure to calibrate country-specific
demographic parameters is described in the main text (Section 3.2). The scatter plots in
Figure C.2 represent the model-implied demographic composition by age against its empirical
counterpart—pooled across all age brackets and countries—at three different dates: 1950,
1990, and 2015 (panels (a)–(c), respectively). In all panels, a point’s coordinates reflect the
size of a given age group as a fraction of the country’s population aged above 20 in the model
(horizontal axis) and in the data (vertical axis). Although our procedure does not allow us
to match demographic composition perfectly, the model’s fit to the data is remarkably good.
Indeed all the points in the scatter plots tend to gather around the 45 degree line, even more
so in the more recent period.
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Figure C.2: Demographic Composition: Model vs Data.
Notes: The scatter plots in this figure represent the model-implied demographic composition by age groups
against its empirical counterpart, pooled across all age brackets and countries, at three different dates: 1950 in
panel (a), 1990 in panel (b), and 2015 in panel (c). The fraction of each age group in the population implied
by the calibrated model (resp. observed in the data) is shown on the horizontal axis (resp. vertical axis). See
Appendix C.2 for the list of 70 countries.
C.4 Household Debt across the World
Household Debt Data. Using data from the BIS completed when necessary with OECD and
Eurostat data, household debt over GDP is observed at annual frequency for an unbalanced
panel of 54 countries over the period 1988-2016. Taking averages over 5-year periods yields
259 country×period observations in total over 1990-2015. The data covers most advanced
countries, but also a number of Central and Eastern European countries and other emerging
markets (e.g., Argentina, Chile, China, Indonesia, Turkey, South Africa, etc.).
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Predicting Household Debt over GDP. For many developing countries though, house-
hold debt is not observable. To remediate this problem and retain the maximum number of
countries in our quantitative evaluation, we use predicted values when the data is missing. To
do so, we estimate the following regression over the panel of household debt observations:
log(hi,t) = a · zi,t + φt + i,t,
where hi,t denotes household debt over GDP in country i and period t, zi,t is a vector of
explanatory variables correlated with household debt over GDP, and φt a period fixed ef-
fect. The log of household debt over GDP in country i is assumed to be linear in three
explanatory variables (all expressed in log). Two are constant over time—namely, the per-
centage of individuals above 15 having ever borrowed from a financial institution and the
percentage of individuals above 15 with a mortgage (as of 2011 from the Global Financial In-
clusion database)—capturing time-invariant differences in credit market development across
countries. A third predictor, private credit over GDP (from the Financial Development and
Structure dataset, using 5-year averages based on annual data), is time-varying. Coefficients
in the regression are all significant at the 5% level with the expected signs and the R2 of the
regression is 83%. Based on this regression, the predicted value of household debt over GDP
in country i at date t is52
hˆi,t = exp[a · zi,t + φt].
Because predictors of household debt are available for a larger cross section of countries than
household debt data themselves, this strategy allows us to consider a significantly larger
number of countries in our quantitative simulations.
Household Debt across the World. Panel (a) in Figure C.3 shows the level of household
debt over GDP across regions in 2005. For each region, we plot the population-weighted aver-
age of household debt over GDP across countries in the region (for the sample of 70 countries
considered in the quantitative model, based on 2005 population weights), using predicted val-
ues when the data is missing. Panel (b) in the figure displays the level of household debt over
GDP across all countries in our sample.
52For consistency with the calibration of social security, we focus on household debt over GDP for the year
2005. When household debt over GDP in country i is missing in 2005 but available at a later date, the predicted
value hˆi,2005 is adjusted by a country-specific factor—e.g., if we observe a debt-to-GDP ratio hi,2010 in 2010
while the predicted value for that year would be hˆi,2010, the adjustment factor is equal to
(
hi,2010/hˆi,2010
)
.
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Figure C.3: Household Debt to GDP across the World in 2005.
Notes: The top panel displays average household debt over GDP by regions (2005 population-weighted) for the
sample of 70 countries used in the quantitative model (see list in Appendix C.2). The bottom panel represents
household debt over GDP against GDP capita for each of the 70 countries. Household debt over GDP data
for 2005 are from the BIS, OECD, and Eurostat. When the data is missing, we use predicted values based
on financial inclusion (World Bank) and private credit over GDP. GDP per capita in 2005 is from the World
Development Indicators.
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Credit Constraint Parameters. The ratios of credit constraints parameters θi/θUS are
set to match household debt over GDP in country i relative to the U.S. in 2005, while the
remaining parameter θUS is calibrated to match the aggregate saving rate of the U.S. in the
same year. The resulting credit constraint parameters used in our baseline calibration are
shown in Figure C.4 as a function of the household debt over GDP in 2005. Not surpris-
ingly, the calibrated credit constraint parameters largely reflect cross-sectional differences in
household debt. However, the mapping between the two variables is not simply proportional.
Indeed, countries in our sample have different demographic compositions at any given date
and thus different shares of households willing to save or borrow. For instance, despite having
a larger household debt to GDP ratio in the data, a young country like Malaysia has tighter
credit constraints than an older country like France. Note that credit constraint parameters
are assumed to be constant over time in our baseline calibration. Sensitivity analysis with
time-varying credit supply shifters is performed in Section 4.2 (see also Appendix D.3).
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Figure C.4: Credit Constraint Parameters and Household Debt over GDP.
Notes: For each country i, the scatter plot represents the credit constraint parameter θi in the baseline
calibration against household debt over GDP in 2005. Household debt over GDP in 2005 is from the BIS,
completed when necessary using OECD and Eurostat data. For countries for which the data is missing, we
report the predicted value using data on private credit over GDP and data on financial inclusion (World Bank).
Sample of 70 countries used in the quantitative experiments (see list in Appendix C.2).
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C.5 Social Security across the World
Official Replacement Rates. To calculate country-specific official replacement rates, %˜i,
we first code the pension system of each country based on data made available by the U.S.
Social Security Administration (Social Security Programs Throughout the World, abbreviated
as SSPTW). Starting from 2002, data are available every other year depending on the region.53
We collected data for the period 2002-2010 for our sample of countries. We restrict our atten-
tion to social security systems and abstract from private pensions (e.g., defined-contribution
plans).54 In a given country, depending on the system in place, the pension received can be a
flat amount (often expressed in national currency), or a flat amount plus a fraction of previous
earnings. These two components depend on the number of years of contribution, which we
denote by y. In order to calculate %˜i, we thus need to obtain, for each country, the average
former real wage and the average number of years of contribution, yi.
For OECD countries, the average wage (in national currency) is directly available. For
other countries, we proxy the average wage by two thirds of the GDP per worker from the
Penn World Tables (PWT), also expressed in national currency. For OECD countries, our
proxy measure for the wage is quite close to the average wage from OECD data (the correlation
between the two in a given period is around 0.95). Real wages are then computed by deflating
the nominal wage with the national consumption price index (using World Bank Development
Indicators). For each country, the flat amount of pensions (expressed in real terms, CPI-
deflated) is then converted as a percentage of the average real wage ten years before the date
at which benefits are received. This flat amount is often conditional on the number of years
of contribution. Pension benefits that come on top of this flat amount are directly expressed
as a fraction of previous wages—which also depends on the number of years of contribution
y.55 Summing the two components gives a schedule of official replacement rates as a function
53Namely, even years for Europe, Asia, and the Pacific, and odd years for Africa and The Americas. See
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/index.html.
54One country in our final sample, Cambodia, is not described in the SSPTW dataset. According to coverage
data from ILO, Cambodia has one of the lowest coverage rate in the world (3% for beneficiaries). Indeed,
the social security system, destroyed in the genocide era, only covers civil servants until 2008. According to
the recently created National Social Security Fund (see http://www.nssf.gov.kh), the system offers fairly high
replacement rates (63%). However, with such a low coverage rate, a precise measure of the official replacement
rate is quite irrelevant for our purpose—which is why we keep Cambodia in our final sample.
55For many countries, the official replacement rate increases by a small percentage per year of contribution
(often up to a maximum), conditionally on a minimum number of years of contribution. Some countries
exhibit more sophisticated schedules of benefits as a function of y, with replacement rates increasing with y
in a non-linear fashion. For countries with a ‘point’ system (Romania and Slovakia in our sample), the value
of a point is converted into a percentage of the average national wage.
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Figure C.5: Social Security across the World.
Notes: The official replacement rate is computed using SSPTW data (SSA). The rate of coverage is measured
as the percentage of contributors in working-age population or the fraction of pension benefit recipients in
old-age population, both in 2005 (Source: ILO). For each region, we plot averages across countries (2005
population-weighted) in the sample of 70 countries considered in the quantitative model (see Appendix C.2).
For a given country, the coverage rate is replaced by its predicted value if missing (using log of GDP per
capita, old dependency ratio, and regional dummies), as per (C-1).
of the number of years of contribution, %˜i(y), for a worker earning the average national wage.
The final step to infer the average official replacement rate %˜i in country i is to compute
the average number of years of contribution yi in the country—then calibrating %˜i to %˜i(yi).
As a proxy for the average number of years of contribution, we use the difference between
the country-specific (male) retirement age and the average age of entry in the labor market
(for males). The retirement age in each country is obtained from the SSPTW data. The
average age of entry in the labor market is proxied by the sum of the age of school entry
and the average years of schooling, where cross-country data on years of schooling are from
the Human Development Reports and the UNESCO. For low-income developing countries for
which the age of entry in the labor market is found below 15, we set it to 15—i.e., the age of
labor market entry is equal to the maximum between 15 and the average age of school exit.
Using the 2003-2006 data, the official replacement rate for each of the 70 countries in
our sample is set to the average across two dates (namely, 2003/2005 or 2004/2006 average
depending on the region). Figure C.5 shows the population-weighted average level of official
replacement rates of ‘pay-as-you-go’ systems across regions in 2005 (left bars).
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Comparison with Other Secondary Data on Social Security. Using the same SSPTW database,
Bloom et al. (2007) compute replacement rates in 2002 for a set of 61 countries which partly
overlaps with ours. We compare our measure of official replacement rates with theirs for the
countries in the overlap (Figure C.6). The two sets of official replacement rates are very close
for most countries, which confirms the validity of our calculations. Some small differences
emerge though due to a slightly different methodology. In particular, Bloom et al. (2007)
does not control for inflation when converting flat amounts (in national currency) into a
percentage of the previous wage. Other differences are driven by a different classification of
private versus public pensions. For instance, countries with mixed—partly public—systems
are not classified in the same way (e.g., the Netherlands and Peru). When differences were
significant, we double-checked our own calculations.
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Figure C.6: Official Replacement Rates: Comparison with Bloom et al. (2007).
Notes: Official replacement rates in 2002 from Bloom et al. (2007) on the horizontal axis compared to our own
calculations based on SSPTW data on the vertical axis (2003 or 2004 depending on the region), for countries
that belong both to the sample of Bloom et al. (2007) and to our sample of 70 countries.
The OECD also provides replacement rates for the average income earner.56 Unfortunately,
these data do not distinguish between social security benefits and alternative pensions schemes
56https://data.oecd.org/pension/net-pension-replacement-rates.htm
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(private, semi-private, etc.). Still, when focusing on countries with fully public systems in 2008
(mostly European countries), the correlation between the two measures is very high, above
0.8. Our measure, which essentially captures replacement rates with full contributions, is
slightly above the corresponding OECD measure, which imputes less than full pensions for a
fraction of the working population—a discrepancy partly corrected for when controlling for
coverage, as we do next.
Social Security Coverage. The World Social Security Report 2010/11 (ILO) provides data
on the coverage of pension systems for a large cross section of countries. Data are based on
surveys conducted in the years 2002-2008 (latest available year)—over the period 2003-2007
for the vast majority of countries, which corresponds to the year 2005 in our calibration.57
Two different measures of coverage are available for slightly different samples of countries:
the percentage of active contributors in the working age population, χiC , available for a cross-
section of 133 countries, and the percentage of pension recipients in the population above
retirement age, χiB, available for 131 countries. Figure C.5 shows the two measures of cov-
erage (percentage of active contributors and percentage of pension recipients) across regions,
along with official replacement rates.58 Not surprisingly, the coverage of pension systems is
significantly lower in emerging than in developed countries—about 3 times lower.
Coverage data are available for the majority of our sample of 70 countries, but not for all
of them.59 Following the same strategy as to deal with missing household debt data, we use
variables that are correlated with social security coverage to predict coverage for countries with
missing observations. In the data, coverage is highly correlated with the level of development
of countries as measured by GDP per capita in 2005 (Figure C.7) and depends in a non-linear
way on the old-dependency ratio: coverage tends to be higher in countries with a higher
fraction of elderly, but less so in the oldest countries. We do not aim at explaining this
pattern of the data,60 and only use demographic variables and income per capita as useful
predictors of coverage. Since the coverage rate is between 0 and 1, we run the following logistic
57See World Social Security Report 2010/11 for the exact survey dates across countries. In our sample of
70 countries, almost all countries’ coverage rates are observed over the years 2003-2007, a vast majority being
observed in 2005-2006. Exceptions are the coverage rate for contributors in Hungary (observed in 2002) and
the coverage rates of Congo Dem. Rep. and Tanzania (observed in 2008).
58For each region, we plot the population-weighted average across countries (2005 population weights).
59For the coverage of contributors (resp. beneficiaries), data are missing for 13 countries (resp. 14 countries)
in our country sample.
60This non-linearity may reflect a tradeoff at play in the design of pension systems: for political economy
reasons, transfers towards elderly are initially higher when their fraction in the overall population increases—up
to a certain point where the sustainability of the system comes into question.
100
ARG
AUSAUT
BEL
BFA
BGD
BGR
BLR
BOL
BRA
CAN
CHE
CHL
CHN
CMR
COD
COL
CZE DEU
DNK
DOM
ECU
EGY
ESP
FIN
FRA
GBR
GHAGIN
GRC
GTM
HKG
HTI
HUN
IDN
IND
ITA
JPN
KEN
KHM
KOR
MAR
MDG
MEX
MLI
MWI
MYS
NER
NLD
NPL
PAK
PER
PHL
POL
PRT
ROURUS
SEN
SVK
SWE
THA
TUR
TZA
UGA
UKR
USA
VNM
ZAF
ZMB
ZWE
0
20
40
60
80
C
ov
er
ag
e 
ra
te
 (i
n 
%
)
1000 2000 4000 8000 16000 32000
Real GDP per capita, log-scale (USD PPP adjusted)
Figure C.7: Social Security Coverage and Level of Development.
Notes: For each country, the rate of coverage is measured as the average between the percentage of contributors
in working-age population and the fraction of retirees who receive benefits in 2005, (χiB+χ
i
C)/2 (Source: ILO).
When missing, the coverage rate is replaced by its predicted value (using log of GDP per capita, old dependency
ratio, and regional dummies) as per (C-1). Sample of 70 countries used in the quantitative evaluation (see list
in Appendix C.2). Real GDP per capita in 2005 is from the World Development Indicators.
regression (GLM estimation) on the entire cross section of countries for which coverage (in
2005) is observed:
log
(
χix
1− χix
)
= ax · zi + ix, x ∈ {B,C},
where χix is the coverage rate for beneficiaries (x = B) or contributors (x = C), zi is a vector
of explanatory variables (log of GDP per capita, old-dependency ratio and square of old-
dependency ratio, as well as regional dummies), and ix is a residual.
61 The selected predictors
are highly significant and capture more than 85% of the cross-sectional variance. Countries
with missing coverage data are imputed the predicted value
χˆix =
exp(ax · zi)
1 + exp(ax · zi) , x ∈ {B,C}. (C-1)
This strategy enables us to retain a large country sample for the quantitative evaluation of
the theory. Figure C.7 shows the average of the two coverage rates, (χiB + χ
i
C)/2, across all
the countries in our sample as a function of GDP per capita.
61The old-dependency ratio is constructed as the population above 60 divided by the population aged 20-60.
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Effective Replacement Rates. Having data on official replacement rates (%˜i) and coverage
rates for beneficiaries (χiB) and contributors (χ
i
C) in 2005, one can compute the effective
replacement rate in 2005 for the two different measures of coverage,
%ix = χ
i
x%˜
i, x ∈ {B,C}.
Our baseline calibration uses the average of these two effective replacement rates,
%i =
%iB + %
i
C
2
=
(
χiB + χ
i
C
2
)
%˜i.
Figure C.8 illustrates the relation between the effective replacement rates %i used in our
baseline calibration and income per capita. Three distinct categories of countries emerge:
low-income countries with very low coverage, for which the official replacement rate is essen-
tially irrelevant (bottom-left corner of the scatter plot); middle-income countries—including
countries with generous official replacement rates, whose effective replacement rate is largely
determined by the rate of coverage (e.g., Egypt), as well as countries with mostly private
systems and thus very low replacement rates independently of coverage (e.g., Peru); countries
with fairly high coverage rate, mostly advanced economies (right part of the scatter plot), for
which the generosity of the pension system is linked to the official replacement rate and to the
degree of privatization of the pension system (compare, for instance, Portugal vs Australia).
Similar patterns hold when using the coverage rate of beneficiaries (resp. contributors) and the
corresponding official replacement rate, %iB (resp. %
i
C). Focusing on cross-sectional heterogene-
ity, the official replacement rate is assumed to be constant over time in our baseline calibration,
equal to its 2005 value. Sensitivity analysis is performed with time-varying replacement rates,
as discussed in Section 4.2 (see also Appendix D.4).
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Figure C.8: Baseline Effective Replacement Rates and Level of Development.
Notes: Effective replacement rates (in %) in our baseline calibration, computed based on 2005 data on public
pension systems (SSPTW) and social security coverage (ILO). Sample of 70 countries used in quantitative
experiments (see list in Appendix C.2). Real GDP per capita in 2005 is from the World Development Indicators.
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D Alternative Experiments and Extensions
This appendix provides additional material referred to in Sections 3 and 4 when we discuss
the performance of the quantitative model under alternative calibrations.
D.1 No Social Security (% = 0)
The experiment in which we remove social security altogether is discussed in the second half
of Section 3.5. Figure D.1, which illustrates the fit of the model in the between dimension
under this alternative calibration, is omitted from the main text for the sake of space.
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Figure D.1: Between Variation in the Absence of Social Security.
Notes: For each country in the scatter plot, the x-coordinate (resp. y-coordinate) corresponds to the average
current account over GDP predicted by the model (resp. observed in the data) over 1990-2015. Model and
data are demeaned in each period. The solid (grey) line is the 45 degree line and the dashed (red) line is the
regression line. Model predictions are obtained by removing social security (% = 0), other parameters being
kept at their baseline values.
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D.2 High E.I.S. Coefficient (σ = 2)
The experiment in which we set σ = 2 is discussed in Section 4.1. Figure D.2, which illustrates
the fit of the model in the between dimension under this alternative calibration, is omitted
from the main text for the sake of space.
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Figure D.2: Between Variation for a High Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution.
Notes: For each country in the scatter plot, the x-coordinate (resp. y-coordinate) corresponds to the average
current account over GDP predicted by the model (resp. observed in the data) over 1990-2015. Model and
data are demeaned in each period. The solid (grey) line is the 45 degree line and the dashed (red) line is the
regression line. Model predictions are obtained by setting σ = 2, other parameters being kept at their baseline
values.
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D.3 Time-Varying Credit Constraints
Figure D.3 depicts the evolution of household debt over GDP in the U.S. over the period
1980-2015. U.S. household debt to GDP has been rising until the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
The deleveraging of households in recent years has led to a fall in the household debt-to-
GDP ratio. Similar evolutions are observed at the world level, although the magnitude of
the swing varies across countries. U.S. household debt data, available over a longer time
span, are used to calibrate the evolution of the level of credit constraints worldwide. We
introduce a worldwide credit supply shifter θt, normalized to 1 in 2005, which multiplies at
each date t the country-specific level of credit constraint θi of our baseline calibration, thus
setting θit = θtθ
i. The credit supply shifter θt varies over the period 1980-2020 in order for
the model to match the U.S. household debt-to-GDP ratio at each date relative to its 2005
value. All other parameters in the simulation are kept at their baseline values. Until 1980
(resp. after 2020), θt is set to 0.31 (resp. 0.70). The obtained path for θt mirrors the steep
rise in U.S. household debt between 2000 and 2008 and its subsequent fall—rising from 0.48
in 2000 to 1 in 2005 before falling to 0.51 in 2010 and 0.39 in 2015.
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Figure D.3: U.S. Household Debt over GDP.
Notes: The data on household debt over GDP in the U.S. are from the Bank of International Settlements.
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D.4 Time-Varying Replacement Rates
As described in Section 4.2, the experiments with time-varying replacement rates assume that
the generosity of social security adjusts to aging in the same way across countries. In any
country i with a social security system, the replacement rate %it falls when the old-dependency
ratio rises, with a constant elasticity (1− ε) as per Eq. (20).62 We consider several alternative
experiments for different values of ε between 0 and 1, where ε = 1 corresponds to our baseline
(i.e., constant replacement rates equal to their 2005 values). A lower value of ε implies that a
greater share of the social security adjustment to aging goes through a reduction in replacement
rates, and less through a rise in contributions. Figure D.4 summarizes the performance of the
model for different values of ε in the between dimension, while Figure D.5 illustrates the fit
of the model for ε = 0.
Regression coefficient
Distance
Figure D.4: Time-Varying Replacement Rates: Performance Summary.
Notes: For each calibration, the top panel shows the estimate of the regression coefficient in (18) along with
its 5% confidence interval, while the bottom panel displays the distance between model and data as defined
by (19). Model and data are averaged in the between dimension. Model predictions are obtained for different
values of the elasticity of the replacement rate to the old-dependency ratio, measured by −(1−ε). The baseline
corresponds to the case of constant replacement rates (ε = 1). For values of ε 6= 1, the path of the replacement
rate in a given country is determined according to (20).
62For countries with fully private systems in 2005 (%i2005 = 0), %
i
t is set to zero at all dates.
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Figure D.5: Between Variation with Time-Varying Replacement Rates (ε = 0).
Notes: For each country in the scatter plot, the x-coordinate (resp. y-coordinate) corresponds to the average
current account over GDP predicted by the model (resp. observed in the data) over 1990-2015. Model and
data are demeaned in each period. The solid (grey) line is the 45 degree line and the dashed (red) line is
the regression line. Model predictions are obtained under the assumption that replacement rates adjust to
population aging according to (20) with ε = 0, other parameters being kept at their baseline values.
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